Metacognition and Decision-Making Style in Clinical Narratives by Hochberg, Limor
Rochester Institute of Technology 
RIT Scholar Works 
Theses 
9-3-2014 
Metacognition and Decision-Making Style in Clinical Narratives 
Limor Hochberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.rit.edu/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Hochberg, Limor, "Metacognition and Decision-Making Style in Clinical Narratives" (2014). Thesis. 
Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed from 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by RIT Scholar Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Theses by an authorized administrator of RIT Scholar Works. For more information, please contact 
ritscholarworks@rit.edu. 
Department of Psychology, College of Liberal Arts
Rochester Institute of Technology





Applied Experimental & Engineering Psychology
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science
September 3, 2014
We approve the thesis of Limor Hochberg:
Dr. Esa Rantanen Date
Associate Professor, Dept. of Psychology, RIT
Faculty Advisor and Chair of the Thesis Committee
Dr. Cecilia O. Alm Date
Assistant Professor, Dept. of English, RIT
Co-Advisor and Reader
Dr. Anne Haake Date
Professor, Golisano College, RIT
Reader
Dr. Caroline M. DeLong Date




I would like to thank my thesis faculty advisor and committee chair, Dr. Esa Rantanen,
co-advisor, Dr. Cecilia O. Alm, and thesis committe members, Dr. Anne Haake and Dr.
Caroline M. DeLong, for their continued support of my work. Thanks for your patience,
advice, careful review, and questions along the way. I’d also like to thank the Human-
Centered Computing Group, who welcomed me as a member and allowed me to work on
previously generated data. I’d like to specifically thank Dr. Qi Yu, a member of the HCC
group, who consulted on the computational modeling work.
I’d like to thank RIT for my graduate education in general, and the Psychology De-
partment faculty and staff in particular. Thanks also to the following RIT institutions for
providing funding towards software purchases and conference travel: the Department of
Psychology, College of Liberal Arts, Office of Graduate Studies, and Division of Student
Affairs. This research has also been supported by an RIT College of Liberal Arts Faculty
Development Grant, a Xerox award, and NIH award R21 LM01002901.1
Parts of this work have been published in the proceedings of the 8th Linguistic An-
notation Workshop (Hochberg et al., 2014a) and the BioNLP Workshop (Hochberg et al.,
2014b).
Thanks to my wonderful annotators, Amir Sivan and Daniel Nystrom. Thanks for your
hard work, patience and insight into physician decision-making.
Finally, thanks to my family, friends, and my wonderful husband. I couldn’t have done
it without your love, advice, and support.
1This content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official
views of the National Institutes of Health.
ii
Abstract
Clinical decision-making has high-stakes outcomes for both physicians and patients, yet
little research has attempted to model and automatically annotate such decision-making.
The dual process model (Evans, 2008) posits two types of decision-making, which may be
ordered on a continuum from intuitive to analytical (Hammond, 1981). Training clinicians
to recognize decision-making style and select the most appropriate mode of reasoning for a
particular context may help reduce diagnostic error (Norman, 2009).
This study makes preliminary steps towards detection of decision style, based on an an-
notated dataset of image-based clinical reasoning in which speech data were collected from
physicians as they inspected images of dermatological cases and moved towards diagnosis
(Hochberg et al., 2014a). A classifier was developed based on lexical, speech, disfluency,
physician demographic, cognitive, and diagnostic difficulty features to categorize diagnos-
tic narratives as intuitive vs. analytical; the model improved on the baseline by over 30%.
The introduced computational model provides construct validity for the dual process the-
ory. Eventually, such modeling may be incorporated into instructional systems that teach
clinicians to become more effective decision makers.
In addition, metacognition, or self-assessment and self-management of cognitive pro-
cesses, has been shown beneficial to decision-making (Batha & Carroll, 2007; Ewell-Kumar,
1999). This study measured physicians’ metacognitive awareness, an online component of
metacognition, based on the confidence-accuracy relationship, and also exploited the corpus
annotation of decision style to derive decision metrics. These metrics were used to examine
the relationships between decision style, metacognitive awareness, expertise, case difficulty,
and diagnostic accuracy. Based on statistical analyses, intuitive reasoning was associated
with greater diagnostic accuracy, with an advantage for expert physicians. Case difficulty
was associated with greater user of analytical decision-making, while metacognitive aware-
ness was linked to decreased diagnostic accuracy. These results offer a springboard for
further research on the interactions between decision style, metacognitive awareness, physi-
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Introduction
Clinical decision-making is a rich and complex cognitive process, with high stakes for
both physicians and patients. Effective clinical decision-making is likely to be found in
individuals who can accurately assess their knowledge base and monitor, evaluate, and im-
plement changes to cognitive strategies. This general construct of self-assessment is known
as metacognition, and it is one of the key variables of interest in the current study. This is
especially relevant for environments characterized by high validity (e.g., statistically regular
environments, from which predictive cues may be learned), such as medicine (Kahneman &
Klein, 2009).
Another factor of interest is clinical decision-making style. What decision style is a
physician using in a given situation? Is the decision based more on gut instinct and imme-
diate recognition, or careful lists of possibilities and subsequent logical analysis? The former
is known as intuitive decision-making, and the latter as analytical decision-making. This
distinction is drawn by Kahneman’s heuristics and biases framework (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974), as well as dual-process models of reasoning (Evans, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick,
2002; Stanovich & West, 2000). Thus decision style, as viewed through the lens of this
framework, is the other key variable of interest in the current investigation.
Metacognition has been shown to aid decision-making (Batha & Carroll, 2007; Ewell-
Kumar, 1999). In addition, metacognitive processes, such as those responsible for detecting
pattern anomalies, regulate the switch from intuitive to analytical modes of cognition during
the decision-making process (Croskerry, 2009). For example, Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley
and Eyre (2007) suggested that task difficulty levels guide the subsequent use of either
the intuitive System 1 or analytical System 2. Thus, the current study also examines the
relationships between metacognitive awareness, case difficulty, and decision-making style.
This work builds on an existing dataset of image-based clinical reasoning, in which
speech data were collected from physicians as they inspected images of dermatological cases
and moved towards diagnosis (Hochberg, Alm, Rantanen, DeLong, & Haake, 2014a). Physi-
cian narratives were annotated for decision style, and these annotations were used as class
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labels to build a model to automatically classify decision style based on linguistic, diag-
nostic difficulty, and demographic features. Decision annotation metrics were also used to
investigate the relationships between decision style, expertise, accuracy, and metacognitive
awareness.
The study rests on several key assumptions about the nature of the speech data collected
from clinicians engaged in a modified Master-Apprentice task (Beyer & Holtzblatt, 1997),
in which they describe the diagnosis as if teaching a student. First, it assumes that their
verbalizations, while also partially reflective of a teaching process, are similar to think-aloud
data, as both involve real-time verbal descriptions of a task as participants perform it. If so,
the claim made of think aloud data – that they reflect the contents of working memory in a
relatively unaltered form (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) – may also be made for the data analyzed
in the current work. Second, it assumes that the linguistic data reflect underlying cognitive
processes, and that individual differences in linguistic style are of interest in studying these
processes (Pennebaker & King, 1999; Cohn, Mehl, & Pennebaker, 2004).
The next section will discuss each variable in detail through the lens of the existing
literature. The methods section will describe the data collection process, performed as part
of the Human-Centered Computing Group at the Rochester Institute of Technology (see
Womack, Alm, Calvelli, Pelz, Shi, & Haake, 2013), as well as the corpus annotation for
decision style. Finally, the results of the computational model of decision-making style,
as well as statistical analyses on decision style, metacognition, and related variables, are
discussed.
Literature Review
What is metacognition?. Metacognition is a fuzzy concept; there is not one uni-
versally accepted definition (see Dinsmore, Alexander & Loughlin, 2008, for a detailed re-
view). However, most attribute the construct’s beginnings to a now-classic article by Flavell
(1979), who defined metacognition as “knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenom-
ena” (p. 906). Flavell proposed two types of metacognition: metacognitive knowledge and
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metacognitive experiences, where metacognitive knowledge concerns “stored world knowl-
edge of...cognitive tasks, goals, actions and experiences”, while metacognitive experiences
are “cognitive or affective experiences” relevant to any intellectual activity (p. 906).
Flavell (1979) further divided metacognitive knowledge into knowledge of a person, task,
or strategy. Metacognitive knowledge of a person concerns knowledge of individuals as cog-
nitive processors, while metacognitive knowledge of a task concerns its demands, difficulty,
the information available to complete it, and the chance of success in meeting the desired
goal. Finally, metacognitive knowledge of strategy is concerned with determining and mon-
itoring the best cognitive strategies for achieving a certain goal. Metacognitive experiences,
in turn, are likely to occur in situations that engage highly involved, analytical thinking or
new situations; they, in turn, can contribute to metacognitive knowledge (Flavell, 1979). For
example, the feeling that one is not using the best cognitive strategy to achieve a particular
task can then influence one’s knowledge and beliefs of what strategies are appropriate in
subsequent similar tasks (see Garofalo & Lester, 1985, for a review of interactions between
components of metacognitive knowledge).
Since Flavell’s work, most researchers have split metacognition into two main compo-
nents that do not necessarily align with Flavell’s distinctions. Almost all agree on the
existence of a metacognitive knowledge component, while the second component generally
concerns metacognitive regulation, or what would be equivalent to Flavell’s metacognitive
strategies component of metacognitive knowledge. This two-component model was first
outlined by Baker and Brown (1984).
Thus metacognition concerns an individual’s knowledge of cognition in themselves and
others, of cognitive strategies, and of the interaction between task demands and cognition;
it also concerns an individual’s effective use of this knowledge base to plan, monitor, evalu-
ate, and update cognitive processes. The first term, metacognitive knowledge, has also been
called self-appraisal of cognition (Paris & Winograd, 1990), as well as declarative knowl-
edge (Kluwe, 1982). The second term, metacognitive regulation, has also been termed self-
management of cognition (Paris & Winograd, 1990), executive processes (Kluwe, 1982), and
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metacognitive skills (Brown, 1978). In an exhaustive review of the origins of metacognition
in academic research, Hacker (1998) nicely defines metacognitive knowledge as “knowledge
of one’s knowledge, processes, and cognitive and affective states” and metacognitive regu-
lation as “the ability to consciously and deliberately monitor and regulate one’s knowledge,
processes, and cognitive and affective states” (para. 27).
Research on metacognition. During the first few decades of work on metacognition,
there were three main categories of research: studies of cognitive monitoring, studies of
cognitive regulation in response to changing task demands, and studies of both monitoring
and regulation. The first, cognitive monitoring, included studies of the tip of the tongue
phenomenon, allocation of study effort, and judgments of learning. In studies of cognitive
regulation, participants first perform a training task, and are then tested on strategy used
in a similar task; this line of study is concerned with how and to what extent individuals
determine which strategies are most effective for a particular task. Finally, studies of both
monitoring and regulation are mostly studies of memory and concern the use of particular
strategies to facilitate recall (Hacker, 1998).
In the last decade, a new area of study has emerged: the study of metacognition in educa-
tional contexts. This line of study attempts to take theoretical knowledge of metacognition
and put it to use in order to improve learning and teaching. Most studies examine whether
metacognitive theory can improve learning, and the overwhelming majority of studies find
that indeed it can (see Hacker, 1998, for a review). Studies of metacognition in educa-
tion have examined the domains of reading comprehension (Artz & Armour-Thomas,1992;
Mokhtari & Reichard, 2002), mathematical skill (Garofalo & Lester, 1985), physics prob-
lems (Neto & Valente, 1997), and medical education, both at the theoretical (Croskerry,
2003a, 2003b; Croskerry & Norman, 2008) and empirical (Coderre, Wright, & McLaughlin,
2010; Mamede, van Gog, van den Berge, Rikers, van Saase, van Guldener, & Schmidt, 2010;
Sherbino, Dore, Siu, & Norman, 2011) levels. Importantly, researchers on metacognition
in education note that metacognitive skills should not be considered an end, but rather a
means to an end (Paris & Winograd, 1990). That is, it is not enough to teach metacognition
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as educational content — a static set of facts. Instead, students should be taught how to
incorporate metacognitive strategies into learning in a variety of domains.
Measurement of metacognition. In their comprehensive review on the assessment
of metacognition, Pintrich, Wolters, and Baxter (2000) suggest a three-component model
of metacognition, as opposed to the two-component model more commonly found in the
literature. Rather than just a metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive monitoring and
control components, the authors suggest that monitoring and control be split into two sep-
arate components. Metacognitive awareness and monitoring refers to online (real-time)
monitoring and assessment of task performance, while the self-regulation and control com-
ponent actively implements changes to cognitive processes, based on knowledge gained from
both metacognitive knowledge (a static, relatively stable component), and metacognitive
awareness and monitoring (a dynamic component). Self-regulation and control includes
planning, strategy selection and use, resource allocation, and volitional control, or control
of motivation, emotions and the environment (Pintrich et al., 2000). The current work
adopts this framework to frame, theoretically, research on the assessment of metacogni-
tion, and focuses particularly on metacognitive awareness, consistently with the literature
treating this component as distinct and empirically measurable (Schraw, 2009). However,
as Pintrich et al. themselves note, researchers have found it difficult to disentangle, and
measure separately, monitoring and control processes in empirical research.
Pintrich et al. (2000) discuss four measures of metacognitive awareness and monitoring:
ease-of-learning judgments (EOL), judgments-of-learning (JOL), feeling of knowing (FOK)
judgments, and confidence ratings. Ease of learning judgments occur prior to a task. When
first engaging in a new task, individuals make judgments with respect to the difficulty level
of a learning task. Judgments of learning occur during or after the task, and are concerned
with online monitoring. An individual might assess the extent to which they understand
or do not understand specific parts of a learning task. Next, feelings of knowing, which
include tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) phenomena, correspond to judgments that an individual
knows they know something, but cannot access or recall the knowledge at that moment
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(Pintrich et al., 2000). Finally, confidence judgments occur either during a task (concurrent
judgments) or after a task has been completed (retrospective judgments; see Schraw, 2009,
for a review). Individuals rate their confidence in the level of their performance, generally
on a scale from 0 to 100 (Pintrich et al., 2000). It is confidence judgment, with respect to
diagnostic accuracy, which is the main measure of metacognitive awareness in the current
study. Individuals whose confidence judgments are good predictors of their performance are
said to be well-calibrated (Pintrich et al., 2000; and see Figure 1, below). Alternatively, such
individuals may also be considered as possessing higher levels of metacognitive awareness.
Figure 1 . A schematic representation of the relationships between confidence and accuracy.
Confidence judgments as measures of metacognitive awareness. This section
discusses the last category, confidence judgments, in greater detail, as they are the pri-
mary indicators of metacognitive awareness in the current study. Confidence judgments
are evaluated with respect to task accuracy, and there are five widely-used measures of
confidence-accuracy relationship. Absolute measures compare confidence for an item or set
of items to accuracy as measured by the proportion of items correct for that item or set
of items, while relative measures represent the extent to which higher confidence is associ-
ated with higher accuracy (Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; Krug, 2007; Nelson, 1996; Weber &
Brewer, 2003). The current study employed relative measures of the confidence-accuracy
relationship, as an important fraction of study participants did not provide confidence judg-
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ments towards the lower end of the scale. This may suggest high confidence, but it may
also suggest that individual physicians simply adjusted the scale so that 40-50 percent con-
fidence was representative, for them, of low confidence. To address this issue, some studies
employ half-range confidence scales, ranging from 50 to 100 percent. Further, scholars
have suggested that absolute (rather than relative) measures are most appropriate for tasks
employing half-range confidence scales (Harvey, 1997; Weber & Brewer, 2003). There are
two commonly used relative measures of the confidence-accuracy relationship. One is the
point-biserial correlation (rpb), which is a correlation appropriate for ordinal and interval
or ratio data; it is mathematically equivalent to the Pearson statistic. The point-biserial






where Mp is the mean for the interval variable values for which the ordinal value is coded
1, Mq is the mean for the interval variable values for which the ordinal value is coded 0, St
is the standard deviation for the interval variable, p is the proportion of interval variable
values coded 1, and q is the proportion of interval variable values coded 0.
The other is the nonparametric Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation, which is a rank
correlation used often in the psychological literature, including to examine the confidence-
accuracy relationship. In this specific application, it considers whether confidence is higher
for correct than incorrect responses, and vice versa. Like the Pearson statistic, it also ranges
from -1 to +1 (Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Krug, 2007; Nelson, 1984). The formula for
the gamma correlation is as follows:
G = Na −Ni
Na +Ni
(2)
where Na is the number of aligned pairs and Ni is the number of inverted pairs.
With respect to the current work, the relationship between physicians’ confidence and
accuracy is of interest because participants with high levels of metacognitive awareness and
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monitoring are likely to be well-calibrated. Particularly, poor calibration may negatively
impact cognitive regulation. As per Pintrich et al. (2000), “if the students believe that they
are learning, when they are not, then they will be unlikely to change or effectively regulate
their cognition and learning” (p. 90).
Methodology for measurement of metacognitive awareness. In terms of method-
ology, the measurement of metacognitive awareness and regulation falls into four main cat-
egories: self-report, error-detection studies, interviews, and think-aloud protocols (Pintrich
et al., 2000; Dinsmore, Alexander, & Loughlin, 2008). In studies of monitoring, self-report
judgments include ease of learning judgments, judgments of learning, feelings of knowing,
and confidence judgments. Measures of these judgments are then compared with actual
task performance. In studies of regulation, self-report questionnaires include the Learn-
ing and Study Strategies Inventory (LASSI; Weinstein, Schulte, & Palmer, 1987) and the
Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire (MLSQ; Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990). In
error-detection studies, participants are asked to read a text and report any contradic-
tions, omissions, or other errors. Students who notice more errors are considered better
monitors of reading comprehension. Finally, interviews, both formal and informal (Artz
& Armour-Thomas, 1992; Swanson, 1990; Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1986) and think-
aloud protocols both offer rich verbalizations, descriptions, and explanations, which are then
studied for evidence of monitoring and regulation, via methods such as protocol analysis
(Pintrich et al., 2000).
Studies of verbal data in clinical reasoning. In this work, spoken descriptions
were elicited from physicians using a modified Master-Apprentice scenario, described in
more detail in the methods section. These data are similar in nature to the speech data
collected in think-aloud studies, in which participants describe the task as they go about it
(Duncker & Lees, 1945; see Nielsen, Clemmensen, & Yssing, 2002, for a review). Specifically,
the think-aloud methodology has been promoted as a fitting tool for the examination of
clinical reasoning (Lundgrén-Laine & Salanterä, 2010).
Lundgrén-Laine and Salanterä note that think-aloud studies allow for linking thought
METACOGNITION AND DECISION STYLE IN CLINICAL NARRATIVES 9
processes with concurrent perceptions, and that the data collected are particularly rich, de-
tailed, and fine-grained. Particularly, they advocate the use of protocol analysis to examine
the resulting data of think-aloud studies. For example, Backlund, Skånér, Montgomery,
Bring, and Strender (2003) asked 20 doctors to think aloud and describe their diagnoses
and suggest treatment in response to six text-based case descriptions of patients with el-
evated cholesterol. Between subsequent revelations of case information (e.g. demographic
information, lab results), they were also asked to rate their likelihood of prescribing phar-
macological treatment. Participant transcripts were divided into statements and classified
as one of ten categories. Categories included attention (repeating or reading basic in-
formation), evaluation (considering information with respect to treatment), rule (general
domain-specific principles), and explanation (inferences). Backlund et al. (2003) also con-
cluded that think-aloud data, in conjunction with protocol analysis, are effective in studying
clinical reasoning, as participants’ verbalizations were consistent with their on-line ratings
of whether they were likely to describe medication.
Interestingly, one study of general problem-solving, which had participants solve the
Tower of Hanoi task, has even linked think-aloud verbalization to the promotion of metacog-
nitive monitoring and regulation (Berardi-Coletta, Buyer, Dominowski, & Rellinger, 1995).
In medicine, think-aloud seminars have been used to teach clinical reasoning skills, though
there are not yet uniform guidelines for doing so (see Banning, 2008, for a review).
However, there are several caveats that must be taken into account when employing
think-aloud tasks. First, verbalization may add cognitive load and impact the allocation
of attention, thus influencing task performance. The extent to which this is likely to occur
is known to be affected by participant age, difficulty of primary task, and verbal ability
(Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Pintrich et al., 2000). In addition, the task instructions are
likely to influence the nature of the verbalizations. Notably, a study of 55 radiographers
who described their impressions of videotaped clinical scenarios found that their decision-
making processes were relatively unstructured (Prime & Le Masurier, 2000). This is in
contrast to a recent study of physician decision-making in dermatology, in which most
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physicians generally followed this pattern: symptoms and morphology, differential diagnosis,
final diagnosis (McCoy et al., 2012); such structure may be reflective of their training.
Instructions for think-aloud verbalizations may vary in their effects on individuals. For
example, any additional cognitive load caused by verbalization may be more detrimental
to novice participants (residents) than expert participants (attendings), since experts are
able to increase working memory capacity by employing schemas developed via expertise
(Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003; Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2003). However, there
is some evidence supporting that verbal protocol studies change the nature of cognitive
processes only in the case of Level 3 verbalizations (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), in which
participants must reflect when prompted (see Bannert & Mengelkamp, 2008, for a review).
Decision-making style. The discussion will now turn to the second variable, decision-
making style, describing both the general theory and its application in clinical contexts.
Klein (1999) has proposed that individuals making decisions in their domain of expertise
often utilize recognition-primed decision-making based on automatic processing and retrieval
of past knowledge. This type of decision-making appears to rely primarily on System 1 pro-
cesses, as discussed in dual-process models of cognition (see Evans, 2008, for a review).
System 1 is characterized by its automatic, rapid, and unconscious nature; System 2, in
contrast, is a controlled, slow, and conscious mode of thought (Evans, 2003; Kahneman &
Frederick, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2000).
In fact, Evans specifically makes a distinction between heuristic (System 1) and analytic
(System 2) modes of reasoning (Evans, 1989, 2006). It is this label, heuristic, that highlights
the use of rules of thumb, or mental shortcuts, in this mode of decision-making. Use of the
heuristic system, while often efficient and useful, may lead to cognitive errors based on
heuristics and biases, generally (Shanteau, 1988) as well as more specifically in the medical
domain (Croskerry, 2003b; Graber, 2009).
Since individuals tend to rely more on heuristic reasoning under time pressure (Rieskamp
& Hoffrage, 2008; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005) or in the face of uncertainty (Hall, 2002),
which occur often in medicine, they are more liable to make cognitive errors due to bi-
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ases and heuristics in such conditions. Croskerry (2003b) classified over 30 such biases and
heuristics, or, cognitive dispositions of respond (CDRs) that underlie diagnostic error in
medicine, including: anchoring, base-rate neglect, the framing effect, hindsight bias, gam-
bler’s fallacy, premature closure, representativeness.2 In fact, Berner and Graber (2008)
note that diagnostic error in medicine is estimated to occur at a rate of 5-15%, and that
two-thirds of diagnostic errors involve cognitive root causes.3
Thus, the current study attempts to distinguish between intuitive and analytical decision-
making processes in clinician verbalization, based on linguistic, demographic, and case dif-
ficulty features. To operationalize decision-making, one of the two main theoretical models
must be chosen as a basis for prediction. The current study employs the dual process
decision-making framework (as in Evans, 2003), for two reasons. First, the recognition-
primed decision-making model focuses on expert decision-making, while dual process the-
ory applies to the full gamut of decision makers, from novice to expert. In this work, the
wide range of professional experience and training level among the physician participants,
ranging from several years to several decades, means that the dual process framework is
more appropriate than the recognition-primed decision-making model. The second reason
concerns quantification: the ease with which variables in each theory are naturally oper-
ationalized. The intuitive-analytical spectrum, following Hammond’s cognitive continuum
(discussed below), is one that is particularly conducive to the evaluation of decision-making
style via a rating scale.
The Cognitive Continuum framework. Hammond (1981) developed the Cognitive
Continuum Theory to describe the relationship between tasks and modes of cognition. In
this framework, intuitive reasoning is described as rapid, unconscious, moderately accurate,
employing simultaneous use of cues, and involving pattern recognition (Hammond, 1981).
Analytical decision-making is described as slow, conscious, more accurate, making sequen-
tial use of cues, based on logical rules, and task-specific (Hammond, 1996). According to
2Such biases have been reported across domains.
3The two additional major error categories in medicine include system and no-fault errors (see Graber,
Gordon & Franklin (2002) for a review).
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Hammond’s theory, however, most reasoning occurs between the two poles of purely intu-
itive and purely analytical decision-making; this type of reasoning is known as quasirational
reasoning (Hammond, 1981; Hamm, 1988). Quasirationality may be characterized by a mix
of, or oscillation between, intuitive and analytical reasoning, or by intermediate values of
the features that define decision-making along the intuitive-analytical continuum.
Hammond suggested that certain tasks best fit certain modes of cognition (Hammond,
2000). Hamm (1988), who wrote extensively on Cognitive Continuum Theory, reviews
three main task features, attributes of which induce either analytical or intuitive decision-
making. Task features include task structure, task ambiguity, and task presentation. With
respect to task structure, well-structured tasks encourage analytical decision-making, while
ill-structured tasks induce intuitive decision-making. With respect to task ambiguity, orga-
nizing principles and unfamiliarity with task content are likely to induce analytical thinking.
Finally, with respect to task presentation, if tasks are decomposed into subtasks, analytical
reasoning is induced. Also, if stimuli are presented pictorially rather than quantitatively,
and if individuals work under time pressure, they are more likely to use intuitive modes of
cognition (Hamm, 1998).
Cader, Campbell and Watson (2005) suggest that cognitive continuum theory is appro-
priate for evaluation of decision-making in nursing and medical contexts. They praise its
parsimony and testability: the ease of operationalizing the framework in empirical research.
They further claim that the representation of intuitive and analytical decision making on
a continuum, rather than as a dichotomy, is a particular strength of the theory, as nurses
(Cader et al.’s population of interest) often use a quasi-rational mode of cognition.
Lauri et al. (2001) collected data from 459 nurses in five countries, who completed a 56-
item domain-specific questionnaire corresponding to the four main stages of decision-making
in nursing: collecting information; processing information; planning; and implementing,
monitoring, and evaluation. Half of the questionnaire items referred to intuitive processes,
and half to analytical processes. For example, participants rated the following statements
on a 5-point Likert scale from always to never: I draw on nursing process thinking to define
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the patient’s nursing problem (analytical) or It is easy for me to see, even without closer
analysis, which pieces of information are relevant to defining the patient’s nursing problems
(intuitive). Factor analysis revealed five factors, termed models, of decision-making: one in-
tuitive, one analytical, and three quasi-rational. Models used varied by country and whether
nurses were in short or long term care. There are at least two study limitations, however:
questionnaires were translated since they were administered in more than one country, and
the study did not employ random sampling. Nonetheless, the study suggests that different
modes of reasoning are used in different nursing contexts, and that the predominant modes
are quasirational, in the middle of the cognitive continuum (Lauri et al., 2001).
The current study extends the application of Cognitive Continuum Theory from the
study of nursing decision-making to the study of physician decision-making in the domain
of dermatology. Decision-making, as it appears in physician verbalizations, was evaluated
with respect to four zones on the cognitive continuum: intuitive decision-making, analytical
decision-making, and two intermediate regions, representing two quasirational modes of
decision-making, one closer to the intuitive end of the scale and the other closer to the
analytical end of the scale.
Purpose of the Research
The purpose of this research is to test the following thesis: Decision making style can be
reliably annotated for narratives of diagnostic reasoning. Furthermore, linguistic and other
features associated with the narratives allow for automatic annotation of decision style.
This thesis rests on two key assumptions: first, that verbal data reflect the contents of
working memory (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), and second, that cognitive processes are revealed
in language use (Pennebaker & King, 1999; Cohn, Mehl, & Pennebaker, 2004). However,
it is reasonable to assume that some, albeit not all, cognitive processes may be revealed in
language use, since not every part of a decision process is available to consciousness (see
Bannert & Mengelkamp, 2008, for a review).
Two more assumptions concern the validity of measures used in the study, including
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related hypotheses on decision-making, expertise, and metacognitive awareness: first, that
metacognitive awareness can be measured via the correlation between confidence and accu-
racy (Pintrich, Wolters, & Baxter, 2000), and second, that physicians’ diagnostic narratives
can be coded on an intuitive-analytical continuum of decision-making style (Hammond,
1981; Lauri & Salanterä, 1994).
Hypotheses. This section lays out the first hypothesis, which corresponds to the the-
sis on the manual and automatic annotation of decision style in physician verbalizations.
Six other hypotheses concern the relationships between decision style, expertise, metacog-
nitive awareness, and case difficulty, and diagnostic accuracy. (For a diagram illustrating
the hypotheses and the major study variables, see Appendix A.)
H1. Decision making style can be reliably annotated for narratives of diagnostic rea-
soning. Furthermore, linguistic and other features associated with the narratives allow for
automatic annotation of decision style.
Further, it has been suggested that intuitive reasoning relies on heuristics and biases,
which are often sources of error in clinical reasoning (Croskerry, 2003b; Graber, 2009).
Therefore:
H2. Intuitive reasoning will be associated with lower levels of diagnostic accuracy.
In addition, experts have more experience, including a broad base to drawn upon in
the use of pattern recognition underlying intuitive decision-making (Klein, 1999; Croskerry,
2006). Thus:
H3. Experts will have better success with intuitive reasoning than novices.
Moreover, previous work has linked perceived difficulty to increased use of analytical
decision-making (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre, 2007). Accordingly:
H4. More difficult cases will be associated with analytical decision-making, while less
difficult cases will be associated with intuitive decision-making.
Metacognitive training has also been shown to aid decision-making (Batha & Caroll,
2007). In addition, in studies of reading (Paris & Oka, 1986) and mathematics knowledge
(Tobias & Everson, 1995), metacognitive awareness has been linked to higher performance.
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Thus:
H5. Higher levels of metacognitive awareness will be associated with higher levels of
diagnostic accuracy.
In addition, metacognition has been deemed key to the development of expertise in
general (Sternberg, 1998) and in medicine (Quirk, 2006). Therefore:
H6. Experienced physicians will exhibit higher levels of metacognitive awareness than
inexperienced physicians.
The final hypothesis concerns the link between metacognition and decision-making style.
As noted above, metacognitive experiences of disfluency/difficulty have been shown to serve
as cue for analytical decision-making (Alter, Oppenheimer and Eyre, 2007; Thompson,
2009). Further, metacognitive awareness prompts individuals to switch to the analytical
System 2 when necessary (Croskerry, 2009). Thus, since physicians with higher levels of
metacognitive awareness may be more attuned to switch-inducing disfluency cues:
H7. Higher levels of metacognitive awareness will be associated with increased use of
analytical decision-making.
Contributions. The current work will shed light on the links between decision style,
metacognitive awareness, expertise, and diagnostic difficulty. This work will also add to
the small base of literature that has reported studies of the link between metacognition
and decision-making, providing more information on the association between the two. In
addition, the study offers a methodological contribution with respect to the annotation
scheme developed for corpus annotation of decision style.
With respect to decision style modeling, this appears to be the first study attempting to
computationally predict physician decision style. Similar to the case of affect (Alm, 2011),
automatic annotation of decision style can be characterized as a subjective natural language
processing problem. This adds special challenges to the modeling process. Accordingly, this
work details a thorough process for moving from manual to automatic annotation.
This study contributes to annotation methodology, cognitive psychology, and clinical
computational linguistic analysis. Methodologically, the study details a careful process for
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selecting and labeling manually annotated data for modeling in the realm of subjective
natural language phenomena, thus addressing the need for their characterization (Alm,
2011). Theoretically, acceptable annotator reliability on decision style, along with successful
computational modeling, will lend construct validity to the dual process model. From a
linguistic perspective, the identification of discriminative features for intuitive and analytical
reasoning provides a springboard for further studying decision-making using language as a
cognitive sensor.
Practically, prediction of decision style would also be useful for determining whether
individuals are using the appropriate style for a particular task, based on analyses linking
decision style to task performance. Thus, in the case of successful modeling of decision
style, this work will provide preliminary support for the development of a new linguistic
measure of decision-making style, which may be derived in real-time. Importantly, detection
of decision style from observable linguistic behaviors allows for objective measurement that
avoids biases present in self-report surveys (Sjöberg, 2003; Allinson & Hayes, 1996).
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Method
The current work makes makes secondary use of one dataset from existing resources,
originally collected to explore research questions concerning image-based diagnostic rea-
soning (Li, Pelz, Shi, & Haake, 2012; Womack, Alm, Calvelli, Pelz, Shi, & Haake, 2013).
Eye-tracking and speech data were collected from dermatologists as they described their
evaluation of images presenting different dermatological diagnoses, with the intent of char-
acterizing perceptual and conceptual components of image understanding and infusing ex-
pertise into the design of an image-retrieval system. Physician eye-tracking patterns, and
their verbalizations, could then be used to develop semantic metadata and discover new
relationships among images, to inform a novel image retrieval system design. Thus, such
elicited data served to gather elements of domain knowledge and cognitive processing that
could be used to evaluate human image understanding and incorporated into the storage of
and search for images (Guo, Li, Alm, Yu, Pelz, Shi, & Haake, 2014).
Participants
Participants were physicians (N= 29; 16 women, 13 men) attending a U.S.-based der-
matology conference in 2011. Eleven were board-certified dermatologists (8 of whom were
educators) and 18 were resident physician dermatologists in training. Participants’ institu-
tion of medical training, years of experience, and whether they were educators was recorded;
age was not recorded. Participants hailed from over nine institutions, and their experience
ranged from several months to 38 years. Two participants were not native English speakers.
The participants received $25 in compensation for their participation in the study and had
a chance of winning an iPad.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Participants were shown 30 images of dermatological symptoms (see Figure 2, below),
indicative of a range of dermatological conditions, on a computer monitor. Images repre-
sented both common (e.g., seborrheic dermatitis) and rare (e.g., lymphomatosis papulosis)
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conditions, and varied in diagnostic difficulty. The images were the sole source of informa-
tion available to the participants (i.e., no patient histories or demographic details were made
available). In this work, each image represents a case; henceforth, each of these stimuli will
be referred to interchangeably with the terms image, case, or image case.
Figure 2 . Example of image case shown to participants, used with permission from Logical
Images, Inc.
Procedure
Each participant saw all 30 images in random order. The participants were asked to
discuss each case as if teaching a student, in a modified Master-Apprentice scenario (Beyer &
Holtzblatt, 1997). The Master-Apprentice scenario is traditionally used in human-computer
interaction studies, in which a researcher serves as the apprentice and learns from an expert
in some task; the expert may be a professional or even a long-time customer. The master-
apprentice scenario has several benefits. First, it assumes that various subtasks, and the
reasons for performing each subtask, are most available to the master as they perform the
task itself. Second, the master-apprentice scenario is a teaching scenario, so it encourages
experts to provide detailed descriptions, with the goal of promoting understanding in the
apprentice. Finally, it promotes a more complete description of the task and the role of
various contextual details, as many experts use environmental cues as triggers to action
(Beyer & Holtzblatt, 1997). In the present study, the scenario was modified in that no
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apprentice or student was actually present.
Participants were asked to describe the case presented to them, and to suggest a dif-
ferential diagnosis (a range of potential diagnoses) and then a final diagnosis. They also
provided a confidence/certainty score, on a scale of 0-100. Along with the audio recordings,
eye movements were tracked and recorded.
There was no time constraint or total time estimate given to participants. Participants
received information at the study outset was that it would include a total of 30 images. Two
students were present in the room, in charge of the eye movement and audio data collection.
A total of 868 narratives (29 participants X 30 images, minus 2 images skipped during
the procedure) were included in this study’s dataset version. Each narrative is about one
minute in length, for a total of 15.8 hours of audio recordings.
Preliminary Data Analysis
Narratives were transcribed and time-aligned to the recordings. A licensed dermatologist
on the research team evaluated each narrative for accuracy on the basis of the final diagnosis.
Narratives received one of five scores: incorrect (57% of narratives), correct (39%), not given
(1%), half (in the case that two final diagnoses were provided and only one was correct;
1%), and partial (in the case that the correct pathological category was noted, but not the
specific diagnosis; 2%).
For the purposes of this work, the half score was counted as correct, while the partial
score was counted as incorrect. This reasoning is in line with other work on this dataset
(e.g., Bullard, Alm, Qi, Shi, & Haake, 2014), and based on the logic that in the case of a half
score, the physician did in fact identify the diagnosis and would be likely to determine the
correct diagnosis with follow-up treatment, while physicians whose narratives were scored
partial did not clearly indicate or identify the specific correct diagnosis. In addition, in this
work, the terms correctness and accuracy are used interchangeably to refer to diagnostic
accuracy, based on the accuracy of final diagnosis as discussed here.4
4While accuracy is the term used in the literature on metacognitive awareness, previous published work
on this research study, by multiple authors, has employed the term correctness (e.g., Womack, Alm, Calvelli,
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Corpus Annotation of Decision Style
The corpus of physician narratives was annotated for decision style in a pilot study and
then a main annotation study (Figure 3).5 Two male annotators with graduate training in
cognitive psychology independently rated each narrative on a 4-point scale from intuitive
to analytical (Figure 4). The two middle labels reflect the presence of both styles, with
intuitive (BI ) or analytical (BA) reasoning being more prominent.6
Figure 3 . Overview of annotation methodology. Conclusions from the pilot study en-
hanced the main annotation study. To ensure high-quality annotation, narratives appeared
in random order, and 10% (86) of narratives were duplicated and evenly distributed in
the annotation data, to later assess intra-annotator reliability. Questionnaires were also
interspersed at 5 equal intervals to study annotator strategy.
Narratives were presented to annotators as anonymized transcripts, and were not ac-
companied by any additional information. Annotator instructions included a definition and
characteristics of each decision style, as well as examples of narratives corresponding to each
of the four decision ratings (see Appendix B). Since analytical reasoning involves detailed
examination of alternatives, annotators were asked to avoid using length as a proxy for
decision style.
Several measures were taken to ensure high-quality annotation of the narratives. The
order of the narratives was randomized. Then, to measure intra-annotator reliability, 10%
(86) of the narratives were duplicated and added to the annotation data; each duplicate
appeared 221 narratives after its first occurrence.7 Finally, five questionnaires were evenly
Pelz, Shi, & Haake, 2013; Bullard et al., 2014).
5Within a reasonable time frame, the annotations will be made publicly available as part of a corpus
release.
6As noted in the annotator instructions, these middle categories could reflect intermediate values of the
features distinguishing decision styles; or a mix of characteristics, from both intuitive or analytical modes;
or reasoning that oscillates between the two modes.
7To reduce the possibility that annotators would recognize a duplicated narrative; the +221 count for
later narratives was wrapped around to the start.
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Figure 4 . Four narratives along the intuitive-analytical decision-making continuum, for
which annotators agreed on their labels, where I=Intuitive, BI=Both-Intuitive, BA=Both-
Analytical, A=Analytical. The narratives were produced by different physicians for the same
image case (left, used with permission from Logical Images, Inc.), and all four physicians
were correct in their final diagnosis. (Confidence mentions were removed in narratives
presented to annotators, to avoid any potential bias.)
spaced among the narratives, which surveyed annotators for their comments and queried
them as to the relative importance of various factors (e.g., silent pauses, or use of justi-
fication) in annotation. In data analysis, primary ratings (the first time the annotators
encountered each narrative) were used for descriptive statistics and inter-annotator relia-
bility, while secondary ratings were used to determine intra-annotator reliability.
After the pilot, the annotators jointly discussed disagreements with one researcher.
Inter-annotator reliability, measured by linear weighted kappa (Cohen, 1968), was 0.4 before
and 0.8 after resolution.
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Both annotators reported using the physician-provided confidence as a factor in deter-
mining the decision-making style of the narrative; analysis of the 30 pilot ratings confirmed
this trend. Thus, in subsequent annotation confidence mentions were removed if they ap-
peared after the final diagnosis (most narratives), or, if interspersed with the diagnostic
reasoning, replaced with dashes (10% of narratives). For example, eighty percent sure this
is a case of contact dermatitis would be changed to — percent sure this is a case of contact
dermatitis.8 Finally, silent pauses9 were coded as ellipses to aid in the human parsing of
the narratives.
8In addition to specific numbers (e.g., ninety), physicians also expressed their confidence with quantifiers
(e..g, low, high) and, rarely, with direct statements (e.g., I am not certain); all were replaced with dashes.
This measure ensured that annotations corresponded to decision style and not confidence.
9As based on provided transcripts (above around 0.3 seconds; see Lövgren & Doorn, 2005).
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Results
Decision Style Annotation
This section details the results of the corpus annotation of decision style. The distri-
bution of annotator ratings, annotator reliability, annotator strategy, and a narrative case
study are discussed.
Quantitative annotation analysis. Table 1 shows the annotator rating distributions
on the 4-point decision rating scale.10 Though Annotator 1’s ratings skew slightly more
analytical than Annotator 2, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed no significant difference
between the two distributions (p = 0.77).
Table 1
Distribution of Annotator Ratings
Rating
Annotator I BI BA A
Annotator 1 89 314 340 124
Annotator 2 149 329 262 127
N = 867. I = Intuitive, BI = Both-Intuitive, BA = Both-Analytical, A = Analytical.
Figure 5 shows visually the distribution of annotation labels for both annotators, re-
spectively, for the whole dataset, on the original 4-point scale.11 In comparison, Figure 6
shows the annotators’ distributions across a collapsed 2-point scale of intuitive vs. analyti-
cal, where, for each annotator, narratives labeled BI were assigned to I and those labeled
BA assigned to A. A 2-point collapsed scale was used for the purposes of computational
modeling of decision style (discussed below).
Annotator agreement was well above chance for both the 4-point (Figure 7) and 2-point
(Figure 8) scales. Notably, the annotators were in full agreement or agreed within one rating
for over 90% of narratives on the original 4-point scale. This pattern of variation reveals both
10N = 867 after excluding a narrative that, during annotation, was deemed too brief for decision style
labeling. See Appendix C for the full confusion matrix.
11Based on the data in Table 1 and repeated for visual comparison with the 2-point scale.
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Figure 5 . The distribution of ratings among
the decision-making spectrum, on a 4-point
scale.
Figure 6 . The distribution of ratings among
the decision-making spectrum, on a 2-point
scale.
Figure 7 . Inter- and intra-annotator reli-
ability for the 4-point scheme, by propor-
tion agreement. The reference line shows
chance agreement (25%). (A1=Annotator
1; A2=Annotator 2).
Figure 8 . Inter- and intra-annotator reli-
ability for the 2-point scheme, by propor-
tion agreement. The reference line shows
chance agreement (50%). (A1=Annotator
1; A2=Annotator 2).
the fuzziness of the categories and also that the subjective perception of decision-making
style is systematic.
Annotator agreement was also assessed via linear weighted kappa scores (Cohen, 1968).
As shown in Figure 9, inter-annotator reliability was moderate, and intra-annotator relia-
bility was moderate (Annotator 2) to good (Annotator 1); see Landis and Koch (1977) and
Altman (1991).
Since both proportion agreement and kappa scores were slightly higher for the 2-point
scale, the automatic annotation modeling discussed below used this binary scale. In ad-
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Figure 9 . Annotator reliability, as measured by linear weighted kappa scores on the 2-pt
and 4-pt scales.
dition, the distribution of data across binary classes was more balanced compared to the
4-point scale, as shown by the contrast between Figure 5 and Figure 6, further making it a
suitable starting point for computational modeling.
Annotator strategy analysis. Five identical questionnaires (Appendix D) evenly
spaced among the narratives asked annotators to rate how often they used various factors in
judging decision style Table 2. Factors were chosen based on discussion with the annotators
after the pilot, and referred to in descriptions of decision styles in the annotator instructions;
the descriptions were based on characteristics of each style in the cognitive psychology
literature (primarily based on two review papers: Evans, 2003 and Evans, 2008). Factors
with high variability (SD columns in Table 2) reveal changes in annotator strategy over
time, and factors that may influence intra-annotator reliability.
Both annotators reported using the rel. (similarity) of final & first-mentioned diagnosis,
as well as perceived attitude, perceived confidence, and use of justification, to rate most
narratives. Types of processing were used by both sometimes; this is important since these
are central to the definitions of decision style in decision-making theory.
Differences in strategies allow for the assessment of annotators’ individual preferences.
Annotator 1 often considered the no. of diagnoses in the differential, and rel. timing of the
differential, but Annotator 2 rarely attended to them; the opposite pattern occurred with
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Table 2
Annotator Use of Factors in Rating Decision Style
Annotator 1 Annotator 2
Factor M SD M SD
Switching between decision styles 1.0 0.0 3.6 0.9
Timing of switch between decision styles 1.6 0.5 4.2 0.4
Silent pauses (...) 2.0 0.0 3.6 0.5
Filled pauses (e.g. uh, um) 2.0 0.7 3.6 0.5
Rel. (similarity) of final & differential diagnosis 2.8 0.4 3.2 0.8
Use of logical rules and inference 3.2 0.8 2.2 0.4
False starts (in speech) 3.4 0.9 2.4 0.9
Automatic vs. controlled processing 3.4 0.5 4.0 0.0
Holistic vs. sequential processing 3.6 0.5 4.4 0.5
No. of diagnoses in differential diagnoses 4.0 0.0 1.6 0.5
Word choice 4.0 0.7 2.6 0.5
Rel. (similarity) of final & first-mentioned diagnosis 4.0 0.0 4.0 0.0
Perceived attitude 4.0 0.7 4.0 0.0
Rel. timing of differential diagnosis in the narrative 4.2 0.8 2.8 0.8
Degree of associative (vs. linear, ordered) processing 4.2 0.4 3.8 0.4
Use of justification (e.g. X because Y ) 4.2 0.4 4.0 0.0
Perceived confidence 4.4 0.5 4.2 0.4
Annotators rated each of the listed factors as to how often they were used in annotation, on a
5-point Likert scale from for no narratives (1) to for all narratives (5). This table shows the
average and standard deviation over all 5 questionnaires, for each annotator. (Some factors slightly
reworded.) A1=Annotator 1, A2=Annotator 2.
respect to switching between decision styles, and the timing of the switch.
The shared high factors reveal those consistently linked to interpreting decision style,
despite the concept’s fuzzy boundaries. In contrast, annotator differences in factor use
reveal starting points for understanding fuzzy perception, and for further calibrating inter-
annotator reliability.
Narrative case study. Examining particular narratives is also instructive. Of the
86 duplicated narratives with two ratings per annotator, extreme agreement occurred for
22 cases (26%), meaning that all four ratings were exactly the same (Figure 10). Notably,
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there were no cases where all four labels (primary + secondary, on the duplicated narratives)
differed, and the distribution is similar to that of the primary rating distribution. Both of
these points further emphasize the phenomenon’s underlying regularity.
Figure 10 . Distribution of duplicated narratives for which annotators exhibited extreme
agreement on decision style rating. I=Intuitive, BI=Both-Intuitive, BA=Both-Analytical,
A=Analytical.
Figure 11 (top) shows such a case of extreme agreement on intuitive reasoning: a quick
decision without reflection or discussion of the differential. Figure 11 (middle) shows a case
of analytical reasoning: consideration of alternatives and logical inference.
Figure 11 . Narratives for which annotators were in full agreement on I (top) and A (middle)
ratings, vs. in extreme disagreement (bottom).
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In the full dataset (initial ratings), there were 50 cases (6%) of 2-point inter-annotator
disagreement and one case of 3-point inter-annotator disagreement (Figure 11, bottom).
This latter narrative was produced by an attending (experienced physician), 40% confident
and incorrect in the final diagnosis. Annotator 1 rated it analytical, while Annotator 2 rated
it intuitive. This is in line with Annotator 1’s preference for analytical ratings (Table 1).
Annotator 1 may have viewed this pattern of observation → conclusion as logical reasoning,
characteristic of analytical reasoning. Annotator 2 may instead have interpreted the phrase
it’s so purple it makes me think of a vascular tumor...so i think [...] as intuitive, due to
the makes me think comment, indicating associative reasoning, characteristic of intuitive
thinking. This inter-annotator contrast may reflect Annotator 1’s greater reported use of
the factor logical rules and inference (Table 2).
Automatic Annotation of Decision Style
This section describes the development of a computational model of decision style, with
the goal of automatically annotating physician narratives. First, the process of data selec-
tion and labeling is described, based on the initial manual corpus annotation of decision
style previously discussed. Next, the methods, features, feature selection, and results of
automatic annotation are detailed. Finally, a study of feature combinations examines the
relative contribution of various feature types towards decision style classification.
Data selection and labeling for computational modeling. This section details
the systematic method used to select data for model development. One of the main goals of
this work was to develop a computational model that could automatically annotate narra-
tives as intuitive or analytical, based on lexical, speech, disfluency, physician demographic,
cognitive, and diagnostic difficulty features. The study employed a supervised learning ap-
proach, and since no real ground truth was available, it relied on manual annotation of each
narrative for decision style. However, annotators did not always agree on the labels, as
discussed above. Thus, strategies were developed to label narratives, including in the case
of disagreement (Figure 12).
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Figure 12 . Narrative labeling pipeline. 614 narratives were labeled due to full binary
agreement, and center-of-gravity and secondary rating strategies were used to label an
additional 58 narratives for which annotators were not in agreement.
The dataset used for modeling consisted of 672 narratives. Annotators were in full
agreement for 614 ratings on the binary scale of intuitive vs. analytical (Figure 13).12 Next,
49 narratives were assigned a binary label based on the center of gravity of both annotators’
primary ratings (Figure 14). For example, if a narrative was rated as Intuitive and Both-
Analytical by Annotators 1 and 2, respectively, the center of gravity was at Both-Intuitive,
resulting in an Intuitive label. Finally, 9 narratives were labeled using the annotators’
secondary ratings,13 available for 10% of narratives, to resolve annotator disagreement.14
Figure 13 . Demonstration of initial corpus labeling, in which 614 narratives were labeled
on the basis of binary agreement.
Narratives with disagreements that could not be resolved in these ways were excluded.
As perception of decision-making style is subject to variation in human judgment, this work
focused on an initial modeling of data which represent the clearer-cut cases of decision style
12Excluding also narratives lacking confidence or correctness information.
13Collected to measure intra-annotator reliability.
14For example, if the primary ratings of Annotator 1 and Annotator 2 were Both-Analytical and Both-
Intuitive, respectively, but both annotators’ secondary ratings were intuitive (e.g., Both-Intuitive or Intu-
itive), the narrative was labeled Intuitive.
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Figure 14 . Demonstration of center-of-gravity strategy, used to label an additional 49
narratives.
(rather than the disagreement gray zone on this gradient perception continuum). From the
perspective of dealing with a subjective problem, this approach enables an approximation
of ground truth, as a validation concept.
Methods. A model was developed for the binary prediction case (intuitive vs. an-
alytical), since 2-point rating had slightly higher annotator agreement (see Quantitative
Annotation Analysis above). Model development and analysis were performed using the
WEKA data mining software package (Hall et al., 2009). The dataset was split into 80%
development and 20% final test sets (Table 3).15 Parameter tuning was performed using
10-fold cross-validation on the best features in the development set.16
Features. Three feature types were derived from the spoken narratives to study the
linguistic link to decision-making style: lexical (37), speech (13), and disfluency (3) features.
Three other feature types relevant to decision-making were demographic (2), cognitive (2),
and difficulty (2) features (Table 4).
Relevant lexical features were extracted with the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC) software, which calculates the relative frequency of syntactic and semantic classes
15This split rests on the assumption that physicians may share common styles. Thus, the testing data
will represent different physicians, but the styles themselves have been captured by the training data so that
they can be correctly classified; the same rationale can be applied to image cases. To further investigate the
phenomenon and identify the degree of inter- and intra-individual variation in decision style, future work
could experiment with holding out particular images and physicians.
16In the feature combination study described below, parameters were tuned for each case of feature
combinations in a similar way.
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Table 3
Class Label Statistics
Label 80% Development Set 20% Final Test Set
Intuitive 276 (51%) 68 (51%)
Analytical 263 (49%) 65 (49%)
Total 539 133
in text samples based on validated, researched dictionaries (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).
Disfluency features were silent pauses, and the frequency of fillers and nonfluencies as
computed by LIWC. Speech features are detailed in Table 4.
Besides linguistic features, three additional groups of features were included, with an
eye towards application. Demographic features were gender and professional status, while
cognitive features were physician confidence in diagnosis and correctness of the final diag-
nosis. Difficulty features consisted of an expert-assigned rank of diagnostic case difficulty,
and the percent of correct diagnoses given by physicians for each image case, calculated on
the development data only.
Feature selection. WEKA’s CfsSubsetEval, an attribute evaluator, was used for fea-
ture selection,17 using 10-fold cross-validation on the development set only. Features selected
by the evaluator in at least 5 of 10 folds were considered best features. The best features
from the entire feature set were: 2nd person pronouns, conjunctions, cognitive process,
insight, cause, bio, and time words, plus silent pauses, speech length, time of min. pitch,
standard deviation of pitch, time of min. intensity, and difficulty: percent correctness/image
case.
Feature selection, using the same attribute evaluator, was also performed on only the
lexical features, which could be a starting point for analysis of decision-making style in
text-only data. The best lexical features18 included conjunctions, cause, cognitive process,
17With BestFirst search method.
18Best lexical features were: function words, singular pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, quantifiers,
and cognitive process, cause, discrepancy, tentative, inclusion, exclusion, perception, see, bio, motion, time,
and assent words.
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Table 4
Feature Types Used For Decision Style Modeling
Type Feature Description / Examples





cognitive process know, whether
. . .
Speech speech length number of tokens
pitch min, max, mean, st. dev., time of min/max
intensity min, max, mean, st. dev., time of min/max
Disfluency silent pauses number of
fillers like, blah
nonfluencies uh, um




Difficulty expert rating ordinal ranking
% correctness/image percentage
The listed lexical features are a sub-sample of the total set. For a complete list of lexical features,
see Appendix E.
inclusion, exclusion, and perception words. These lexical items seem associated with careful
examination and reasoning, which might be more present in analytical decision-making and
less present in intuitive decision-making. Some categories, especially inclusion (e.g., with,
and), exclusion (e.g., but, either, unless), and cause words (e.g., affect, cause, depend,
therefore), seem particularly good representatives of logical reasoning and justification, a
key feature of analytical reasoning. But as shown in the next section, when available, speech
and disfluency information is useful, and potentially more so than some lexical features.19
19Feature selection was also performed only on the linguistic (lexical, speech, and disfluency) features as
a group. The best features of these types were: second personal pronouns, conjunctions, cognitive process,
insight, cause, bio, and time words; silent pauses; and speech length, time of minimum pitch, standard
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Decision style modeling results. Table 5 lists the results for the Random Forest
(Breiman, 2001) and Logistic Regression (Cox, 1972) classifiers on the best features (as
selected from all features) on the final test set, after training on the development set.
Random Forest aggregates the results of multiple decision tree classifiers (Brieman, 2001),
while Logistic Regression weights each feature to best explain the variance in a predicted
binary variable (Cox, 1972). These results suggest that decision style can be quantified and
classified on a binary scale; the percent error reduction (compared to baseline) for both
classifiers is substantial.
Table 5
Decision Style Classifier Performance on Final Test Set
Performance Metric
Classifier %Acc %ER Pr Re
Random Forest 88 76 88 88
Logistic Regression 84 67 84 84
Majority Class Baseline 51 – – –
Performance on final test set; reduction in error (%ER) is calculated relative to majority class base-
line. Precision (Pr) and recall (Re) are macro-averages of the two classes.
Feature combination exploration. A study of feature combinations was performed
on the final test set with Random Forest (Table 6) to explore the contribution of each fea-
ture type towards automatic annotation. The best performance was achieved after applying
feature selection on all features. Lexical and disfluency features were useful for determining
decision style, and the best linguistic features (chosen with feature selection) were slightly
more useful. These latter feature types improve on the performance achieved when con-
sidering only speech length and silent pauses, which were apparent characteristics to the
human annotators and among the best features (see Feature Selection section).
Demographic features improved somewhat over the baseline, indicating an association
deviation of pitch, and time of minimum intensity. They could represent a starting for point for analyzing
speech data not enhanced by additional speaker and task information.
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Table 6




(Lexical + Speech + Disfluency)* 86
Lexical + Speech + Disfluency 84
Lexical + Disfluency 84
Only speech length and silent pauses 81
Disfluency 79
Lexical 77
Demographic + Cognitive 68
Demographic 64
Majority Class Baseline 51
Star (*) indicates the use of feature selection.
between gender, professional status, and decision-making, and adding cognitive features
increased performance. Importantly, overall these findings hint at linguistic markers as key
indicators of decision style.
Physician-Level Metrics of Decision Style and Metacognitive Awareness
Below, two metrics created for the assessment of physician decision style and metacog-
nitive awareness are described. The decision style metric is based on annotator ratings for
decision style, while the metric for metacognitive awareness is based on the relationship
between confidence and accuracy for each physician. Both metrics are later used in the
evaluation of the study hypotheses.
Physician profiles of decision style. Annotations were also used to characterize
physicians’ preferred decision style. A decision score was calculated for each physician as







(rA1i + rA2i) (3)
where p is a physician, r is a rating, n is total images, and A1, A2 the annotators. Anno-
tators’ initial ratings were summed – from 1 for Intuitive to 4 for Analytical – for all image
cases for each physician, and divided by 2 times the number of images, to normalize the
score to a 4-point scale. Figure 15 shows the distribution of decision scores across residents
and experienced attendings.
Figure 15 . Distribution of physician decision scores by expertise.
Residents exhibited greater variability in decision style. While this might reflect that
residents were the majority group, it suggests that differences in expertise are linked to de-
cision styles; such differences hint at the potential benefits that could come from preparing
clinical trainees to self-monitor their use of decision style. Interestingly, the overall distri-
bution is skewed, with a slight preference for analytical decision-making, and especially so
for attendings. Additionally, analyses of gender and decision style, diagnostic accuracy, and
metacognitive awareness may be found in Appendix F.
Physician profiles of metacognitive awareness. Metacognitive awareness was
computed for each physician (see Equation 2), based on the gamma correlation between
their confidence estimates and diagnostic correctness across all image cases. Figure 16
shows the distribution of the gamma correlations among the 29 physicians. Gamma ranges
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from -1 to 1 (Bornstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Krug, 2007; Nelson, 1984), depending on the
direction and strength of the confidence-accuracy relationship. As shown below, confidence
and accuracy tended to be positively associated for the physician participants in this study,
but the strength of this link varies among them.
Figure 16 . Distribution of metacognitive awareness among physicians, as measured by the
gamma confidence-accuracy correlation.
The gamma correlation was chosen over the other relative measure of the confidence-
accuracy relationship, the point-biserial correlation, since the gamma correlation is non-
parametric, and thus makes less assumptions about the nature of the data (Krug, 2007).
Second, the gamma correlation is considered the best measure of resolution, which captures
individuals’ tendency to have high vs. low confidence for accurate vs. inaccurate decisions
at the level of the individual items or stimuli (Nelson, 1984). This is in contrast to other
measures of the confidence-accuracy relationship, which consider individuals’ overall level
of confidence and compare it to their overall accuracy. Essentially, the gamma correlation
captures the degree to which, for a particular item, an individual’s confidence is predictive
of accuracy.
Hypothesis Evaluation
Below, the results of hypothesis evaluation are reported (with the exception of H1, which
corresponds to the decision style model discussed in the previous section). These hypotheses
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were evaluated using primary and secondary metrics based on raw annotation, confidence or
accuracy data, including the decision score and metacognitive awareness metrics described
in the previous section.
Table 7 lists and describes each metric, so as to serve as a reference for the following
sections. Certain metrics were calculated based on the entire 867-narrative dataset, while
others were calculated only using the 672-narrative dataset used for computational model-
ing.20 This is because certain metrics take advantage of the binary (intuitive vs. analytical)
labels applied to narratives in this latter set. Finally, the term correct, or alternatively ac-
curate, as applied to physician narratives, is based on physicians’ final diagnoses, as scored
by a licensed dermatologist.21
Decision style. Three hypotheses concerned physician decision style, with respect to
the relationship between decision style and diagnostic accuracy, expertise, and case difficulty.
Since there are multiple possible metrics for decision style (see Table 6), as well as multiple
levels of analysis (physician vs. narrative), some hypotheses are evaluated with several
analyses.
H2. Intuitive reasoning will be associated with lower levels of accuracy.
This hypothesis was evaluated from two perspectives. The narrative level considered
the relationship between the use of intuitive reasoning and diagnostic accuracy with each
physician narrative as the basic unit of analysis, across physicians and cases. In contrast,
the physician level considered the relationship between intuitive reasoning and accuracy for
each physician, to answer the question: do physicians who tend towards intuitive reasoning
have lower rates of diagnostic accuracy?
Narrative-level analysis. First, at the narrative level, a frequency table was created,
comparing decision style and accuracy across physicians and image cases. Table 8 shows the
relationship of physicians’ diagnostic correctness by decision style (intuitive vs. analytical
on a binary scale), given the 672-narrative dataset.
20See the section titled Data Selection and Labeling for Computational Modeling for more detail.
21See the section titled Preliminary Data Analysis for more information.
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Table 7
Summary of Case and Physician Metrics
Computed For Metric Description Data
Physician metacognitive awareness gamma confidence-accuracy correlation across all
cases for each physician (see Eq. 2)
867
Physician physician decision score averaged, normalized metric based on raw decision
ratings for each physician (see Eq. 3)
867
Physician physician proportion correct proportion of correct narratives for each physician 867
Physician physician analytical proportion proportion of analytical narratives for each physi-
cian
672
Physician intuitive-correct proportion proportion of correct narratives, out of total num-
ber of intuitive narratives, for each physician
672
Physician analytical-correct proportion proportion of correct narratives, out of total num-
ber of analytical narratives, for each physician
672
Case case difficulty percent correct for each image case, across all physi-
cians (see Eq. 4)
867
Case case decision score averaged, normalized metric based on raw decision
ratings for each case
867
Case case analytical proportion proportion of analytical narratives for each case
(based on binary narrative labels)
672
In the Data column, 672 indicates the dataset used for computational modeling, with use of
binary decision labels where appropriate; 867 indicates use of the entire set of narratives, with use
of 4-point decision ratings where appropriate.
Overall, there was a slightly higher prevalence of intuitive reasoning, and there were
more incorrect than correct diagnoses.22 Table 8 also suggests a relationship between cor-
rectness and decision-making style, where for correct diagnoses, intuitive reasoning was more
dominant. The opposite trend held for incorrect diagnoses: analytical reasoning was more
frequent. Indeed, a chi-square test revealed a significant relationship between correctness
and decision style, χ2(1, N = 672) = 13.05, p < 0.01.
22Contributing factors to the proportion of incorrect diagnoses might include case difficulty levels in the
experimental scenario, and that physicians did not have access to additional information, such as patient
history or follow-up tests.
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Table 8
Distribution of Diagnostic Correctness by Decision Style
Correctness
Decision style Correct Incorrect Total
Intuitive 158 186 344
Analytical 106 222 328
Total 264 408 672
Physician-Level Analysis. Two physician-level analyses were performed. The first was
based on the binary decision labels, while the second was based on the decision score
computed for each physician based on annotator ratings on the 4-point rating scale.23
For the first analysis, two new metrics were created for each physician, also based on
the 672-narrative dataset. The first, intuitive-correct proportion, was the proportion of
correct narratives, out of the total number of intuitive narratives. The second, analytical-
correct proportion was the proportion of correct narratives, out of the total number of
analytical narratives. Table 9 illustrates the correctness by decision style categorization.
The intuitive-correct proportion was calculated as a/c, and the analytical-correct proportion
was calculated as d/f.
Table 9
Schematic Representation of Decision Style by Correctness
Correct Incorrect Total
Intuitive a b c
Analytical d e f
An intuitive-correct proportion (a/c) and analytical-correct proportion (d/f ) were computed for
each physician.
23For more information, see the section titled Physician Profiles of Decision Style.
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Both the the intuitive-correct proportion and analytical-correct proportion were com-
puted for each physician. Next, before any statistical analysis, a frequency histogram was
constructed to examine the trend (Figure 17). As apparent in the figure, intuitive reason-
ing was clearly associated with higher accuracy, opposite to the anticipated trend, so no
further hypothesis testing was necessary. However, a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test showed
a significant difference between the intuitive-correct (Mdn = 0.50) and analytical-correct
distributions (Mdn = 0.29), U= 172, p < 0.001. This shows a significant trend in the op-
posite (than anticipated) direction, linking intuitive decision-making to greater diagnostic
accuracy.
Figure 17 . Distribution of correctness at the physician level, comparing the intuitive-correct
proportion and analytical-correct proportion.
A second analysis used the decision score calculated for each physician, and compared it
to each physician’s overall accuracy (number of image cases correct/total number of image
cases). These metrics were used to evaluate, in another way, whether physicians who tend
towards intuitive reasoning are generally more accurate in their diagnosis. This evaluation,
due to the nature of the metrics, utilized all 867 data points.
Figure 18 shows the results of this analysis. There is no apparent correlation between
decision score and physician correctness. Indeed, a Spearman correlation between the two
variables was not different from zero, rs(29) = .13, p = .516.
Thus, the narrative-level analysis and the first physician-level analysis suggested that
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Figure 18 . Relationship between physician decision score and physician proportion correct.
intuitive reasoning was linked to higher accuracy, rather than lower accuracy as anticipated.
The second physician-level analysis showed no link between decision style and diagnostic
accuracy. Taken together, all three analysis failed to confirm Hypothesis 2.
H3. Experts will have better success with intuitive reasoning than novices.
To examine this hypothesis, a between-group comparison was performed for residents
vs. attendings (experts). Success with intuitive reasoning was defined for each physician as
the intuitive-correct proportion: the proportion of cases that were diagnosed correctly using
intuitive reasoning, out of all of the cases that were diagnosed using intuitive reasoning.24
Intuitive reasoning was defined based on the binary labels used in computational modeling,
which restricted this analysis to the 672-narrative dataset.
Figure 19 shows the distribution of the residents vs. attendings (experts), with respect to
the intuitive-correct proportion metric. The graph shows that attendings (Mdn = 0.55) had
better success with intuitive reasoning than residents (Mdn = 0.44), and a Mann-Whitney
test revealed a significant difference between the distributions, U= 42, p = .009. Thus, this
result supports Hypothesis 3.
H4. More difficult cases will be associated with analytical decision-making, while less
24This metric was also used to evaluate Hypothesis 2; see Table 9.
METACOGNITION AND DECISION STYLE IN CLINICAL NARRATIVES 42
Figure 19 . Success in using intuitive reasoning, by expertise. The horizontal line indicates
the median of each distribution.
difficult cases will be associated with intuitive decision-making.
To examine this hypothesis, the relationship between case difficulty and decision style
was evaluated. Case difficulty was measured by the percent of correct diagnoses for each
image case, over all physicians.25 Thus, this metric was highest (100%) for easy image cases,
which all physicians diagnosed correctly, and lowest (0%) for difficult image cases, which
no physicians diagnosed correctly.
Decision style was measured in two ways, so two analyses were performed, one for
each decision style metric. First, a decision score was created for each case, similar to the






(rA1i + rA2i) (4)
where c is a case, r is a rating, n is total images, and A1, A2 the annotators. Annotators’
initial ratings were summed – from 1 for Intuitive to 4 for Analytical – for all physicians for
each image case, and divided by 2 times the number of cases, to normalize the score to a
4-point scale. Case decision score was calculated based on the entire dataset (867 annotated
narratives). Since it is a continuous score based on raw annotator ratings, is likely be a
better estimate of case decision score than a metric based on the binary labels used for
25This metric was also used in the computational model of decision style. The other available difficulty
metric, the expert dermatologist rating of difficulty, was not used to evaluate this hypothesis, as it is an
ordinal rating and is likely to be more subjective than a performance-based metric based on many individuals.
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computational modeling of decision-making.
Figure 20 shows the relationship between case difficulty and case decision score. As case
difficulty increases, the case decision score tends towards analytical reasoning. A Spearman
correlation between the two measures was significant, rs(30) = -.51, p = .004.
Figure 20 . Relationship between case decision score and case difficulty.
The second measure of decision style was the case analytical proportion, defined as
the proportion of analytical ratings for each case across all physicians. As case analytical
proportion is based on the binary decision labels, it was computed based on the 672-narrative
dataset used for computational modeling. Figure 21 shows the relationship between case
analytical proportion and case difficulty. As the case difficulty increases, the use of analytical
reasoning does as well. Indeed, a Spearman correlation between the two measures was
significant, rs(30) = -.54, p = .002. Thus, both analyses of the link between case difficulty
and decision style support Hypothesis 4.
Metacognitive awareness. The two hypotheses on metacognitive awareness concern
the link between it and diagnostic accuracy, as well as expertise. For both hypotheses,
metacognitive awareness was computed for each physician as the gamma correlation between
confidence and accuracy, across all cases diagnosed by the physician. For more information
on gamma, see the section Physician Profiles of Metacognitive Awareness.
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Figure 21 . Relationship between case difficulty and case analytical proportion.
H5. Higher levels of metacognitive awareness will be associated with higher levels of
diagnostic accuracy.
This hypothesis was evaluated at the physician level, since only individuals (rather than
cases) can possess metacognitive awareness. To evaluate this hypothesis, metacognitive
awareness was defined as the confidence-accuracy correlation for each physician, as discussed
above. Diagnostic accuracy was defined for each physician as the physician proportion
correct: the proportion of cases that the physician diagnosed correctly. Since neither metric
relies on binary decision labels, the larger dataset of 867 narratives was used to compute
each metric.
Figure 22 shows the relationship between metacognitive awareness and physician pro-
portion correct. The two measures were negatively correlated, rs(29) = -.40, p = .032.
This trend was in the opposite direction than anticipated, so this result fails to confirm
Hypothesis 5.
H6. Experienced physicians will exhibit higher levels of metacognitive awareness than
inexperienced physicians.
This hypothesis was assessed by comparing metacognitive awareness, as defined by the
confidence-accuracy gamma correlation, in the resident vs. attending (expert) group. Fig-
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Figure 22 . Relationship between metacognitive awareness and physician proportion correct.
ure 23 shows the distribution of metacognitive awareness among residents (Mdn = .525) and
attendings (Mdn = .495). A Mann-Whitney test revealed no significant difference between
the two distributions, U= 86.5, p = .588. Thus, this result fails to confirm Hypothesis 6.
Figure 23 . Metacognitive awareness by expertise. The horizontal line indicates the median
for each group.
Decision style and metacognitive awareness. This final hypothesis considers the
link between decision style and metacognitive awareness.
H7. Higher levels of metacognitive awareness will be associated with increased use of
analytical decision-making.
This hypothesis was evaluated by examining the relationship between metacognitive
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awareness and decision style. As previously, metacognitive awareness was defined by each
physician’s gamma confidence-accuracy correlation, while decision style was computed ac-
cording to two different metrics.
The first decision style measure used was physician decision score, which provides a gen-
eral assessment of a particular individual’s decision style across all cases s/he diagnosed.26
Figure 24 shows the relationship between metacognitive awareness and physician decision
style. The two measures were not significantly correlated, rs(29) = .18, p = .360.
Figure 24 . Relationship between metacognitive awareness and physician decision score.
The second decision style measure used was the physician analytical proportion, calcu-
lated for each physician based on the 672-narrative dataset used for computational modeling.
For each physician, the proportion of narratives labeled analytical was computed, out of
all the physician’s narratives.27 Figure 25 shows the relationship between metacognitive
awareness and physician analytical proportion. The two measures were not significantly
correlated, rs(29) = .17, p = .366. Together, both analyses fail to support Hypothesis 7.
26See the section titled Physician Profiles of Decision Score for more information on this metric.
27Equally, the corresponding physician intuitive proportion could have been computed and used for this
analysis, as the decision labels are binary, so that both proportions together make up the entire whole.
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Figure 25 . Relationship between metacognitive awareness and physician analytical propor-
tion.
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Discussion
Decision Style Annotation and Modeling
In this work, annotators showed a systematic perception and moderately reliable anno-
tation of decision style, which was successfully detected for each narrative at substantial
improvement over the baseline. Thus, Hypothesis 1 – Decision style can be reliably anno-
tated in from physician verbalizations in clinical reasoning contexts, and used to create a
computational model for the automatic annotation of such verbalizations – was supported.
The fact that decision style could be annotated reliability, and that such annotation could
be used, further, for modeling and automated annotation prediction, lends validity to the
dual process theory (Evans, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2000).
It also lends support to claims that cognitive processes, particularly decision style, are
revealed in language use (Pennebaker & King, 1999; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).
The study leaves exploration of finer-grained computational modeling at the 4-point
scale for future work. Further study could also focus on determining the optimal rating
scale for decision annotation, which approaches the limits of annotators’ ability to reliably
detect reasoning style. In this work, the rating scale was a 4-point rather than 5-point
rating scale, so as to force annotators to decide whether intuitive or analytical reasoning
was more prominent. However, it may be the case that a 5-point, 6-point, or even 7-point
scale of decision style may be appropriate in some contexts. Such a scale would provide
higher resolution for statistical analyses linking decision style to performance. Alternatively,
annotators may be asked to suggest their own annotation scale, as in Burstein and Chodorow
(2014), in which essays were annotated for coherence, also a subjective task. Aggregation
and analysis of such scales over multiple annotators may give additional insight into mental
models of decision style as well as the limits of resolution with respect to decision style
judgment.
Based on the results of corpus annotation, it is clear that annotators consider a range
of factors in decision style annotation. To improve future corpus annotation, an iterative
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annotation process could be used, in which annotators work on smaller portions of the cor-
pus, in stages of annotation-evaluation-adjustment, with re-annotation based on additional
training, or even adjustments to the rating scale, when necessary (Pustejovsky and Stubbs,
2012). In this work, the pilot and the main annotation represent two annotation cycles,
which is preferable to only one cycle; and in fact, the discussions with annotators yielded
the basis for the annotator questionnaire and several other key adjustments to corpus anno-
tation. Finally, another, more expensive way of ensuring good corpus annotation is to use
more than two annotators. Such a study might even compare the inter-annotator reliability
between experts in cognitive psychology, medicine, and naive annotators without expertise
in either domain, so as to shed light on the relative importance of domain expertise in
clinical decision annotation, and the extent to which more expensive expert annotation is
necessary.
Based on the feature combination study, linguistic features were more useful in predic-
tion of binary decision style than demographic and cognitive features. This finding supports
the use of post-hoc analyses of existing language data for decision style, via both manual and
automatic annotation of decision style, so as to analyze the relationship between decision
style and accuracy in particular contexts and domains, even when demographic and cogni-
tive information is not available. Disfluency features, particularly silent pauses, were also
important in decision style prediction. These results also align with Womack et al. (2012),
who proposed that silent pauses in physician narration may indicate cognitive processing.
Thus, this pattern of results may be due to the fact that analytical decision-making may
recruit more cognitive resources than intuitive decision-making. There is also an interesting
parallel to other fairly recent findings that subjective disfluency cues (in the non-linguistic
sense) prompt the use of analytical reasoning (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007).
Future work might investigate the link between subjective experiences of disfluency and
disfluencies in language, as, taken together, these studies may suggest that the two may be
positively correlated. That is: individuals who experience feelings of disfluency or difficulty
may be more likely to utter disfluent tokens, so that both may be positively correlated with
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use of analytical reasoning in decision-making contexts. If this prediction is borne out, then
disfluent tokens in language may be a useful proxy for subjective experiences of difficulty
and disfluency, with the advantage that naturally elicited speech is an online, non-invasive
form of data that avoids biases resulting from directly querying participants.
Finally, the distribution of decision annotation ratings showed that most clinical decision-
making occurs in the central part of the continuum. This result is in line with the Lauri
et al. (2001) study, in which nurses in five countries were asked to rate statements repre-
sentative of intuitive or analytical decision-making on a 5-point scale. The authors found
that reasoning varies with context and that styles in the middle of the cognitive continuum
predominate. This result may be interpreted in a positive light, since it shows that clini-
cians exhibit flexibility in the process of decision-making. In fact, it has been suggested that
clinicians may benefit from recruiting both System 1 and System 2 for the same diagnostic
case, and thus reap the benefits of each (Norman, 2009).
Decision Style and Metacognitive Awareness
Decision style and diagnostic accuracy. Hypothesis 2 – Intuitive reasoning will be
associated with lower levels of diagnostic accuracy - was not supported. In fact, the opposite
trend was observed: intuitive reasoning was linked to greater levels of diagnostic accuracy.
This result, while not in the anticipated direction, sheds light on the debate over the ac-
curacy of System 1 vs. System 2. Although System 1 has been linked to the inappropriate
use of heuristics and biases, which may decrease diagnostic accuracy (Croskerry, 2003b), it
has also been linked to claims that intuitive reasoning is linked to better performance when
much information is to be processed. In this view, mechanisms of intuitive reasoning and
pattern recognition allow individuals to overcome the limitations of their working memory
(Evans, 2008).
Viewed from the perspective of cognitive continuum theory, the higher prevalence of
incorrect diagnoses for physicians using analytical decision style may be due to a mismatch
between reasoning style and the task demands of the particular case (Hammond, 1981).
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Finally, it might be the case that diagnostic difficulty was a moderating variable, where
physicians preferred intuitive reasoning for less challenging cases, and analytical reasoning
for more difficult cases. In fact, this connection between difficulty and decision style was
observed with respect to Hypothesis 4, discussed below.
It is notable that the binary decision-based analysis supported the link between intuitive
decision style and increased diagnostic accuracy, while the physician decision score was not
linked to diagnostic accuracy in either direction. This may be because physician decision
scores were computed as a normalized average across all cases, so that most scores were
clustered in the middle range of the decision continuum and, thus, were not predictive due to
low variance. This difference may also be related to the fact that the analyses were done on
different-sized datasets, which may have varied systematically (e.g., in which certain cases
were represented more than others, and/or in the case that narratives for which annotators
disagreed shared some key characteristics).
Intuitive reasoning, diagnostic accuracy, and expertise. Hypothesis 3 – Experts
will have better success with intuitive reasoning than novices – was confirmed. This is
based on the significant difference between the distributions of correct diagnoses when using
intuitive reasoning, among residents vs. attendings (expert physicians). This observation
is line with the fact that experts have a broader base of experience to draw on, and is
also in line with Klein’s theory of recognition-primed decision-making, by which experts are
able to quickly assess a situation and determine a response based on pattern recognition
mechanisms developed over years of experience (Klein, 1999). These results are also in line
with a recent empirical study, which found that expert basketball players had more success
using intuitive reasoning than non-experts when asked to judge the difficulty of basketball
shots (Dane, Rockmann & Pratt, 2012). In the same study, experts were also better than
non-experts at recognizing authentic vs. counterfeit handbags when using intuitive reasoning
(Dane et al., 2012). Taken together, these studies and the current work are notable in that
all three experimental tasks incorporate perceptual expertise, and all three found that,
with respect to intuitive decision-making, experts have more success than non-experts. In
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an applied setting, these results may suggest it is beneficial to encourage experts to trust
their intuition, at least under certain conditions. This may be especially relevant in domains
where analytical reasoning is valued or where explicit, post-hoc rationalizations of mission-
critical decisions are necessary in investigative reports, both of which may encourage the
use of analytical reasoning even when it is sub-optimal.
Case difficulty and decision style. Hypothesis 4 – More difficult cases will be as-
sociated with analytical decision-making, while less difficult cases will be associated with
intuitive decision-making – was confirmed, based on two analyses, each of which used a
different decision metric (case decision score and case analytical proportion). These results
are in line with claims by Alter et al. (2007) that experiences of disfluency and difficulty are
linked to greater use of analytical decision-making, assuming that more difficult cases did
in fact prompt such experiences in the physician participants in this study. In addition, this
link between difficulty and decision style may explain the results of Hypothesis 3, in which
intuitive reasoning was linked to greater diagnostic accuracy. If physicians tend to use intu-
itive reasoning for easier cases, it is no surprise that they are also more likely to be correct
in those instances. Since the original experimental study did not systematically manipulate
case difficulty – rather, case difficulty was a measure derived from physician performance
– the extent to which difficulty moderates the link between reasoning style and diagnostic
accuracy cannot be determined. However, future studies on clinical decision-making might
systematically manipulate both decision style and difficulty in order to determine the nature
of the interactions between decision style, diagnostic difficulty, and diagnostic accuracy.
Metacognitive awareness and diagnostic accuracy. Hypothesis 5 – Higher levels
of metacognitive awareness will be associated with higher levels of diagnostic accuracy – was
not confirmed. In fact, a significant trend was observed in the opposite direction, in which
higher levels of metacognitive awareness were linked to lower levels of diagnostic accuracy.
This result was surprising, and contrasts with previous assertions that metacognitive aware-
ness is linked to increased performance in the domains of reading and mathematics (e.g.,
Paris & Oka, 1986; Tobias & Everson, 1995). Also in clinical settings, there is some pre-
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liminary evidence, from laboratory settings, that metacognitive interventions based on con-
scious reflection have the potential to help individuals correct initial misdiagnosis (Coderre,
Wright, & McLaughlin, 2010) and somewhat reduce availability bias (Mamede, van Gog, &
van den Berge K, 2010). However, the vast majority of proposed cognitive interventions to
reduce diagnostic error, a category which includes metacognition-based intervention, have
either never been tested, or not been tested out of the laboratory (Graber et al., 2012).
This finding on the link between greater metacognitive awareness and decreased diag-
nostic accuracy should be taken with some reservation, since it contrasts to claims from
both empirical and theoretical literature that metacognition is positively correlated with
performance. It may be the case that, in this study, the measure of metacognitive awareness,
as it was based on the confidence-accuracy relationship for each physician, suffered from
sub-optimal estimates of its two components. With respect to confidence, physicians used
the scale inconsistently (see Limitations section, below) and may have varied with respect
to internal notions of low vs. high confidence. In addition, the relatively high prevalence of
incorrect diagnoses, higher than misdiagnosis rates in general clinical practice,28 also lead
to inaccurate estimates of diagnostic accuracy. Together, these effects may have skewed the
measure of metacognitive awareness in this study, so that it was not an accurate estimate
of physicians’ true metacognitive awareness.
Another factor with potential impact on physicians’ metacognitive awareness is the
nature of the experimental task. Since in clinical contexts, dermatologists generally have
access to additional information, such as patient history, and can also request additional
information from the patient and order follow-up tests, they are likely to calibrate their
metacognitive awareness regarding diagnosis with respect to the actual clinical environment.
Accordingly, it is possible that that the physician participants in this study, since they had
less experience and feedback on their performance in diagnosing based solely on images,
had skewed or lower confidence-accuracy calibration than they may have in professional
contexts. Future work might investigate the links between metacognitive awareness and the
28Estimated at 5-15%, depending on the specialty (Berner & Graber, 2008).
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amount and type of information available to physicians, and the ecological validity of the
experimental context.
Metacognitive awareness, diagnostic accuracy, and expertise. Hypothesis 6 –
Experienced physicians will exhibit higher levels of metacognitive awareness than inexperi-
enced physicians – was not confirmed, based on the similar distributions of metacognitive
awareness in the resident vs. attending groups. This is somewhat surprising, as metacog-
nition has been deemed to key to the development of expertise, both generally (Sternberg,
1998) and in medicine (Quirk, 2006). In addition, improvements in metacognitive aware-
ness have been linked to immediate feedback (El Saadawi et al., 2010), to which experts
have likely had greater exposure over a lifetime of practice. On the other hand, it may
be the case that, once attending physicians leave residency, they no longer get immediate
feedback about clinical decisions from expert physicians, so there is no related increase in
metacognitive awareness. Also, the El Saadawi et al. study was performed in the context of
an instructional system, so such findings may not translate to clinical contexts in the long
term.
In addition, it may be that metacognitive awareness is a relatively stable trait, related
more to an individuals’ propensity towards analytical thought (Thompson, 2009), rather
than expertise. Also, as discussed with respect to Hypothesis 5, this finding may be due to
biases affecting the measurement of metacognitive awareness via the confidence-accuracy
relationship. Finally, this failure to support the hypothesis may be due to the small available
sample size, as each group of physicians consisted of less than 20 individuals. Perhaps the
effect, if it exists, can only be detected in large sample sizes; this is an additional avenue
for future research.
Metacognitive awareness and decision style. Hypothesis 7 – Higher levels of
metacognitive awareness will be associated with increased use of analytical decision-making
– was not confirmed, based on analyses linking metacognitive awareness to two different met-
rics of decision style (physician decision score, averaged over all cases for each physician, and
use of physician use of analytical decision-making, based on binary decision labels). As dis-
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cussed above, this failure to confirm the hypothesis is consistent with several explanations:
either that the metrics used for decision style and metacognitive awareness were inaccurate
estimates of each; that sample size was insufficient to detect and effect; or that there is in
fact no effect. With respect to this latter scenario, if Alter et al. (2007) are correct that
difficulty (and other contextual cues) prompt the use of analytical decision-making, it may
be the case that such cues are so salient that an individuals’ level of metacognitive aware-
ness does not mediate this difficulty-decision style link. However, even if this explanation
is borne out empirically, metacognitive awareness may also serve decision-making through
other processes and mechanisms (see Thompson, 2009, for a review). Thus, future research
should systematically manipulate and measure decision style and metacognitive awareness
so as to better determine the nature of the relationship between them, particularly with
respect to clinical reasoning.
Limitations
Using a secondary dataset, while not uncommon in academic research, does have certain
limitations, as the study was not originally designed to answer the research questions posed
in the current study. The first concern is with respect to ecological validity: in real-world
medical contexts, physicians diagnose not only on the basis of visual information but on
the basis of lab results, vitals, patient demographics, patient risk factors and lifestyle, and
other information. Based on their differential diagnosis, physicians can order tests and
follow-up visits before determining a final diagnosis. In the study task, however, physicians
made diagnoses on the basis of limited visual information, so that their diagnoses may
represent only part of the overall clinical decision-making process. This may be reflected
in the relatively high rate of incorrect diagnoses, though that may also be due to the
inclusion of residents, who are still in training, in the study. In addition, the master-
apprentice scenario asks physicians to describe each image case as if teaching a student, so
the narratives may reflect teaching processes as well as decision-making process. Finally,
since participant physicians also varied with respect to their professional and educational
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backgrounds, these training differences might have been another unmeasured source of
variance affecting decision style. Future work might study the effects of training lineages
on clinical decision style systematically, or perhaps attempt to create a relational hierarchy
classifying and categorizing the various approaches in relation to theoretical frameworks of
decision-making.
This work also relies on the assumptions that verbal data reflect working memory (Eric-
sson & Simon, 1993), and that cognitive processes are revealed in language use (Pennebaker
& King, 1999; Cohn, Mel & Pennebaker, 2004). However, diagnosis, particularly in a vi-
sual medical specialty such as dermatology, also relies on visual attention and perceptual
processes (Anderson & Shyu, 2011). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that these processes
are not necessarily reflected in physicians’ spoken narratives.
Another concern is with respect to the measurement of intuitive vs. analytical decision-
making. It is possible that while there is some variability in participants’ decision-making,
their most intuitive and most analytical exemplars may not in fact be representative of the
far ends of the spectrum. It is possible, then, that the reasoning reflected in the current study
spans the middle of the intuitive-analytical spectrum, so that reasoning considered intuitive
or analytical in the current experiment is only partially reflective of reasoning that is purely
intuitive or purely analytical. However, since the variability within clinician reasoning in the
current dataset could be measured reliably by both human and computational classification,
then at least some features of intuitive vs. analytical reasoning were present in the narratives.
Finally, the LIWC software used for lexical features considers surface strings rather than
their conceptual senses; future work might operate on the sense rather than token level,
and may also consider discourse structure in the narratives.
In addition, certain features of the task used in the current study may have induced
particular types of reasoning. In his discussion of cognitive continuum theory as applied to
clinical reasoning, Hamm (1988) notes that specific tasks which are “presented in a manner
that guide the doctor to address a sequence of subtasks...will induce analytical cognition”
(p.6). Thus, the fact that the task required participants to provide a case description,
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differential diagnosis, and then a final diagnosis may have influenced participants to use an
analytical decision-making process. However, Hamm also notes that “if the information is
presented pictorially, it induces intuition” (p.6). Thus, the images provided as stimuli in
the study may have induced intuitive reasoning among participants. Finally, Hamm notes
that explicit or implicit time pressure may induce intuitive thinking: “if only a brief time is
available, the doctor will adopt intuitive cognition” (p.6). This may have implications for the
current study as well. While the task was not performed under any explicit time pressure,
and physicians cued when they were ready the next image case, they may have still been
under some implicit time pressure. This is because the participants were generally informed
of the total task duration of around 30-45 minutes, and were also told in the experimental
instructions that the task would include 30 images. Thus, participants may have deduced
that they had about a minute per image case, and performed the task under this unstated
expectation. In addition, participants may have been eager to complete the task quickly
and return to other responsibilities.
Finally, another concern is with respect to confidence scores, which were used to estimate
metacognitive awareness. Clinicians may even be trained, implicitly or explicitly, not to
show uncertainty, resulting in an inflation of confidence scores reported (see Katz, 1984,
for a review). In fact, Croskerry and Norman (2008) note that overconfidence is the most
significant bias in clinical decision-making. In this study, in fact, physicians tended to use
only the upper range of the confidence scale, in line with these claims.
Applications
The decision annotation scale and computational model of decision style can be used as
a starting point for the development of computational models to analyze speech data for
decision style in other domains. The usefulness of linguistic features supports the applica-
bility of computational modeling to decision style more broadly, since linguistic data may be
captured conveniently and non-invasively. Accordingly, future empirical work might focus
on modeling and understanding domain influence. This application, of analyzing language
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data in real time or post hoc, is especially relevant for tasks in which verbal communication
is a natural and integral part. This includes team contexts, such as air traffic control, cer-
tain medical contexts, and crisis management. If reliable linguistic markers of intuitive and
analytical reasoning are in fact uncovered for such contexts, individual or team performance
can be measured with respect to the mode of reasoning employed. These results can then
be correlated with measures of performance on various tasks in order to determine which
type of reasoning best suits particular tasks, as per cognitive continuum theory (Hammond,
2000). Interestingly, such analyses may find that certain tasks can be performed equally
well using either type of reasoning; this might then inspire further study of why this is the
case. In addition, for those tasks for which expertise is correlated with an increase in intu-
itive reasoning, linguistic measures can also be used to track individuals as they progress
from novice to expert in a certain domain. Finally, since intuitive reasoning has sometimes
been associated with biases, it can be detected and extracted from a language database,
and then examined for evidence of biases, especially in the case of novice-training contexts.
This is especially relevant in contexts in which individuals perform under real or perceived
time pressure, which may induce intuitive reasoning (Hamm, 1988).
In addition, the computational model of decision style, after additional research to
improve prediction across multiple clinical contexts, may be used in clinical instructional
contexts with natural language interfaces. Based on linguistic input, this model can be used
to assess whether trainees are using the appropriate style for a particular task (Hammond,
1981), and it can help users determine and attend to their own decision styles, towards
improving diagnostic skill (Norman, 2009). This modeling, since it is successful on the basis
of only linguistic features, can be useful even when demographic or case difficulty features
are unavailable. Such language-based measures of decision style can also be used to assess
whether interventions, such as those promoting metacognitive awareness, are effective in
promoting flexible and task-appropriate use of Systems 1 and 2. Instructional systems
might also track the stability of decision style preferences over time, and also be used to
study the effects of metacognitive interventions on diagnostic accuracy and decision style.
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Conclusion
This work suggests that decision style is revealed in language use, in line with claims
that linguistic data reflect speakers’ cognitive processes (Pennebaker & King, 1999). Theo-
retically, this study adds validity to the dual process and cognitive continuum theories, and
articulates a novel way of measuring decision-making style from linguistic data. Method-
ologically, this study also details strategies for the annotation of fuzzy semantic phenomena
and label selection for their modeling, as well as tools to understand annotator strategy. In
addition, this work proposed several metrics of decision style at both the case and physi-
cian level, based on the developed annotation scale. Analyses based on these metrics found
that intuitive reasoning is linked to greater diagnostic accuracy; that experts enjoy greater
such accuracy than non-experts when using an intuitive decision style; and that diagnostic
difficulty is linked to greater use of analytical decision-making. Meanwhile, analyses regard-
ing the link between metacognitive awareness and decision style were inconclusive, so this
relationship deserves future study, both in clinical contexts and in other domains.
Practically, detection of decision style is useful for both clinical educational systems
and mission-critical environments. Clinical instructional systems can assess whether par-
ticipants are using the appropriate style for a particular task (Hammond, 1981), and help
students determine and attend to their own decision styles, towards improving diagnostic
skill (Norman, 2009). In mission-critical environments, linguistic markers of decision style
can be used to determine the optimal modes of reasoning for tasks in high-stakes human
factors domains.
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Appendix A
Concept Map of Study Variables and Hypotheses
Figure A1 . This concept map illustrates the major study variables and hypotheses.




We conducted an experiment in which dermatologists were asked to look at digital images of patients
with skin disorders and describe the findings to a trainee while working towards the diagnoses.
The attached documents are the transcribed versions of the verbal descriptions captured during the
above experiment. Since they are verbatim transcripts of the audio they might contain repeated
words, incomplete sentences, disfluencies like uh and um, etc.
New to instructions since pilot:
• Narratives now include ellipses, which indicate pauses
• Indications of physician confidence have been removed from the narratives, either by removal
of final clauses containing the confidence judgments or by substituting dashes for certain words
(for example "—– percent certainty").
• Five questionnaires have been added – please answer them as you encounter them based on
the last set of narratives rated; please let me know if you have any questions!
• Please also note that diagnoses are sometimes abbreviated, such as iga or scle.
We would like you to rate each narrative on its predominant decision-making style.
Rating Scale
Please rate each narrative as:
I – Intuitive– reflecting primarily intuitive processes and decision-making
BI – Both, but intuitive appears more dominant – reflecting intermediate values of the features;
reflecting a mix of characteristics, from both intuitive or analytical modes; or oscillating between
the two modes; but with more tendency towards the intuitive style
BA – Both, but analytical appears more dominant – reflecting intermediate values of the features;
reflecting a mix of characteristics, from both intuitive or analytical modes; or oscillating between
the two modes; but with more tendency towards the analytical style
A – Analytical – reflecting primarily analytical processes and decision
Please put the letter code in the "Rating" column to the right of each narrative.
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Features of Intuitive or Analytical Decision-making
Intuitive decision-making is:
• holistic – considers the case as a whole
• based on simultaneous use of cues
• automatic – involuntary; requires little or no conscious effort and attention
• associative – draws connections between related ideas in a non-linear fashion
Analytical decision-making is:
• step-by-step
• based on sequential use of cues
• governed by rules of logic and domain principles
• likely to include justification
Please use these guidelines while rating the narratives, as well as your general intuitions based on
your previous knowledge of human factors and cognitive psychology.
Examples
You’ll notice that the intuitive narratives tend to be shorter than the analytical narratives. However,
please avoid using length in coding the narratives!
Example of an Intuitive narrative:
... um ... numerous tan to ... gray-brown ... um ... verrucous stuck-on plaques ... differential
diagnosis ... seborrheic keratosis ... diagnosis seborrheic keratosis
Example of a Both-Intuitive narrative:
... mm kay s- ... so have ... an axilla that’s got ... lots of uh ... redness and ... uh ... looks like
swelling ... and obviously uh ... uh flaccid bullae ... with uh ... yellow ... uh ... filling of the bullae
... multiple small ... vesicles ... mostly this looks like a contact dermatitis ... um ... uh could also
be bullous pemphigoid pemphigus ... uh hailey-hailey ... um could be those things but looks mostly
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like ... uh contact dermatitis just with how uh ... um ... large red and angry and ... it has uh some
areas of sparing
Example of a Both-Analytic narrative:
... s- is a lower extremity ... extensor aspect ... and there are ... uh ... at least ... ten plus ... um
... small to large fluid-filled ... tense bullae ... so this is a blistering disease ... uh this ... could
be pemphigus vulgaris ... could be ... bullous pemphigoid ... um ... most likely is a bullous drug
eruption ... or bullous bite reaction ... mm there look to be areas that have healed as well with
some early scarring so ... i would say it is one of the bullous diseases ... um ... would definitely have
biopsy ... diagnosis ... and ... mm not that old ... um ... i will lean towards ... pemphigoid
Example of an Analytical narrative:
... okay uh i am seeing uh ... a ... polycyclic um ... eruptions uh on ... what appears to be a leg
or a thigh ... that is with some pretty intense erythema ... uh also with um ... uh some centrally
located vesicles um ... could be a bullae that or at least there’s a few little erosions ... um ... and
... uh there’s a number of different things that could cause this i would be thinking about like a
... possibly a linear iga bullous dermatosis uh even tinea can do something like this uh ... if it was
more uh although i’d expect it to be a little bit more scaly and not sort of uh ... and more centrally
located uh ... or a centrally located scale ... uh if it was bullous tinea ... um ... possibly like a
... uh ... eac but uh i uh think if i had to narrow it down i would probably favor like a linear iga
bullous dermatosis uh ... or other ... um ... i guess you could think about like uh ... uh bullous
lupus potentially um ... for this i’d have to ... i mean i’d really want a biopsy with uh ... for a tinea
and for dif and ... i don’t know as far as percent certainty i’d say like ... —– percent without some
confirmatory evidence ... next ...
Thanks
Thank you for your time. Let me know if you have any questions as you go along!
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Appendix C
Decision Style Annotation Confusion Matrix
Figure C1 . Confusion matrix for two annotators on the 4-point decision rating scale; full
agreement is shown in green. I = Intuitive, BI = Both-Intuitive, BA = Both-Analytical, A
= Analytical.






Please respond based on your judgments for
the last set of narratives (i.e., since the last
questionnaire)
FREE FORM: How are you rating each
narrative?
What indicates an intuitive (I) style of reason-
ing?
What indicates an analytical (A) style of rea-
soning?
How do you distinguish between A and BA?
How do you distinguish between BA and BI?
How do you distinguish between BI and I?
How often do you use each factor in rat-
ing the narratives?
I use this factor to rate.... Comments
1 (no narratives)
2 (few narratives)
3 (about half of the narratives)
4 (most narratives)
5 (all narratives)
Automatic v. Controlled Processing
Holistic v. Sequential Processing
Degree of Associative Processing
Use of Justification
Use of Logical Rules and Inference
Word Choice Did you use any spe-
cific words or phrases?
Silent pauses (...)
Filled pauses (e.g. uh, um)
False starts (participant starts a word or
phrase, then partially repeats or re-starts)
Number of diagnoses included in differential
diagnosis
Timing of differential diagnosis
Relationship between final diagnosis and first
or second diagnosis mentioned
Five identical such questionnaires were presented to annotators, within the Excel document used
for decision style annotation.
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Table D2
Annotator Strategy Questionnaire - Continued
Relationship between final diagnosis and dif-
ferential diagnosis
Whether a participant switched from one more
of reasoning to another
Timing of switch between modes of reasoning
Whether the differential diagnosis seemed au-




Other macro-level (narrative-level) judg-
ments: please detail
Other please detail here
Other please detail here
Open-Ended Questions
Please detail any changes or adjustments to
your coding system since the last question-
naire
Please describe any other general comments
and/or concerns
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Appendix E
Complete List of Lexical Features In Computational Model of Decision Style
Table E1
Complete List of Lexical Features Used For Decision Style Modeling
Feature Examples
function at, most, very
pronoun i, she, him
personal pronoun i, them, her
first person singular pronoun i, me, mine
first person plural pronoun we, us, our
second person pronoun you, your
third person singular she, her
third person plural they, their
impersonal pronoun it, those
article a, an, the
common verbs walk, went
auxiliary verbs am, will, have
future will, gonna
preposition to, with, above
conjunction and, but












perceptual processes feel, hear, press
Lexical features correspond to categories in the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count Software
(Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).
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Table E2
Complete List of Lexical Features Used For Decision Style Modeling - Continued
Feature Examples
see look, saw







assent ok, okay, alright
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Appendix F
Gender Effects on Decision Style and Metacognitive Awareness
This study included two main demographic variables, expertise and gender. In this ap-
pendix, the relationship between gender and decision style, diagnostic accuracy, and metacog-
nitive awareness is explored. There were 16 female and 13 male physician participants.
Figure F1 shows physician decision scores by gender (see Equation 3 and Physician
Profiles of Decision Style, above). A Mann-Whitney test found no significant difference
between the male (Mdn = 2.9) and female (Mdn = 2.4) physicians, U=64, p = .082.
Figure F1 . Distribution of physician decision scores by gender.
Figure F2 compares diagnostic accuracy, as measured for each physician by percent
correct across all narratives, among male (Mdn = .400) and female (Mdn = .433) physi-
cians. A Mann-Whitney test revealed no significant difference between the two distributions,
U=85.5, p = .423.
Figure F3 compares success in intuitive reasoning (as measured by the intuitive-
correct proportion; see Table 9, above) among male (Mdn = .467) and female (Mdn =
.500) physicians. A Mann-Whitney test revealed no significant difference between the two
distributions, U=97.5, p = .786.
Figure F4 shows the distribution of metacognitive awareness, as measured by the
gamma confidence-accuracy correlation (see Physician Profiles of Metacognitive Awareness,
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Figure F2 . Diagnostic accuracy by gender. The horizontal line indicates the median of
each distribution.
above) among male (Mdn = .600) and female (Mdn = .507) physicians. A Mann-Whitney
test revealed no significant difference between the two distributions, U=97, p = .770.
Based on these analyses, no gender effects were found on decision style, diagnostic
accuracy, or metacognitive awareness. These results are in line with the computational
model developed for automatic annotation of decision style, in that gender was not among
the best features for modeling. It may be the case that there are gender effects, but
the sample size here was too small to detect them; or, alternatively, that there are not
Figure F3 . Success in using intuitive reasoning, by gender. The horizontal line indicates
the median of each distribution.
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Figure F4 . Metacognitive awareness by gender. The horizontal line indicates the median
of each distribution.
gender effects on these variables. Future work might investigate this link more carefully,
particularly with respect to the link between decision style and gender, which so far in
the literature exhibits mixed results (e.g., Hayes, Allinson, & Armstrong, 2004; Sadler-
Smith, 2011). In addition, metacognitive awareness might be studied with an eye towards
previously reported gender effects on confidence, by which women tend to be less confident
than men (see Jakobsson, Levin, & Kotsadam, 2013, for a review).
